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The time has passed where people contracted only within the boundaries of their own 
countries. The world has opened up and personal mobility, transnational communications and 
global trade increases constantly. Regardless of the associated advantages like economic 
growth, trade between parties located in different countries created many problems from a 
legal perspective. Questions on the applicable law, the determination of jurisdiction and the 
requirements under which a foreign judgment can be enforced in another country arose. The 
private international law
1
, which is regulated by every country independently, addresses these 
questions.
2
 Within the European Union (EU) the international private law is unified and 
implemented supranationally.
3
 One of these instruments is the Brussels I Regulation
4
. It 
determines the jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial disputes between individuals resident in different Member States of the EU. By 
stipulating a set of rules applicable within all countries of the EU, the Brussels I Regulation 
contributes to unification and therefore a simplification of the private international law in its 
field of application.  
 
Since coming into force a couple of years ago the European Commission was obliged to 
present a report on the efficiency of the application of the Brussels I Regulation accompanied 
with proposals for adoptions, if needed.
5
 In doing so the Commission published such a report
6
 
(„the Report‟) together with a Green Paper on the Brussels I Regulation
7
 („Green Paper‟) on 
21 April 2009 based on a study, the so called Heidelberg Report
8
, carried out by German 
Professors, who had been assisted by experts from various EU countries. The Green Paper´s 
purpose was to launch a broad consultation among interested parties on possible ways to 
improve the operation of the Regulation with respect to the suggested adjustments to the 
                                                 
1
 Also called private international law or conflict of laws. 
2
 R Fentiman (1996) Conflict of Laws xii. 
3
 T Kruger Civil jurisdiction rules of the EU and their impact on third states In.01. 
4
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [2001] OJ L12/1. 
5
  The obligation exists according to Art. 73 Brussels I Regulation. 
6
 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial matters , COM(2009) 174 final. 
7
 Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial matters, COM(2009) 175 final. 
8
 Study JLS/C4/2005/03 presented by D Hess, T Pfeiffer and P Schlosser, available at 
















Brussels I Regulation raised in the Report.
9
 It focused inter alia on the Regulation´s interface 
with arbitration proceedings, which are generally excluded from its scope according to Art. 1 
(2) (d). Arbitration as an alternative to litigation has become increasingly popular especially 
in the field of international trade.
10
 As a chosen private system of justice it does not follow the 
rules of national court proceedings. However, although the aim is to exclude court 
interference to the most possible extent, arbitration is yet dependant on the courts‟ support. 
They alone have the power to enforce a certain degree of legal standards and to rescue the 
system when it is in danger of failing.
11
 These arbitration related court proceedings create an 
indistinct interface with the Brussels I Regulation, since it is sometimes unclear whether or 
not they are covered by the scope of the exclusion of Art. 1 (2) (d). The possibility of parallel 
litigation and arbitration proceedings caused by this fact weakens arbitration. Not least 
because of the recent West Tanker
12
 decision of the European Court of Justice („ECJ‟) this 
problem and possible ways to avoid it became subject of a comprehensive and long lasting 
debate. 
 
The Green Paper proposed many possible amendments in order to ensure a smooth circulation 
of judgments in Europe and prevent parallel proceedings; one of the most radical was to 
delete the arbitration exclusion completely.
13
 The suggestions sparked a lot of critique, 
expressed inter alia in the many responses during the Green Paper´s consultation period. On 
14
 
December 2010 the European Commission finally published a concrete proposal for a 
revised Brussels I Regulation
14
 („Proposal‟). It remains to be seen whether the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers will adopt the Proposal. 
 
The paper´s aim is to convey an understanding of the complex interface between the Brussels 
I Regulation and arbitration and to analyse and evaluate possible ways to improve their 
interaction. In doing so, it gives at first a brief overview about the history and the scope of the 
Brussels I Regulation and about the laws most important to arbitration. Moreover, the reasons 
behind the exclusion of arbitration from the Brussels I Regulation will be explained. 
                                                 
9
 See introduction of the Green Paper. 
10
 I Carr International Trade Law 615, 621; for a more detailed overview of the advantages of arbitration see N 
Blackaby; C Partasides Redfern and Hunter in International Arbitration paras 1.86-1.151. 
11
 N Blackaby; C Partasides, op cit note 10 at paras 7.01, 7.02. 
12
 Allianz SpA, formerly Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtà SpA and Generali Assicurazioni Generali SpA v West 
Tankers Inc. C-185/07 [2009] E.C.R. I-663. 
13
 Green Paper, p 8. 
14
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition 















Following, the paper points out the interface between the two fields and illustrates the 
problems which occur in this context and how the courts and academia have responded. The 
proposed changes from the Heidelberg Report on the Green Paper to the recently published 
Proposal will be introduced and finally evaluated. The paper will end with a concrete 
suggestion on how the Brussels I Regulation should be amended in order to keep the 















B) The current legislation 
Litigation and arbitration are not regulated in the same way in the European Union. While 
there exists a uniform regulation, the Brussels I Regulation, which provides a set of rules on 
the determination of jurisdiction as well as rules on the recognition and enforcement of 
judgements given in another Member State, a similar regulation for arbitration on a European 
level is not in existence. This chapter gives an overview of the history and the scope of the 
Brussels I Regulation and with regard to the topic of this work the most important laws 
applicable in international arbitration. 
 
 
I) Brussels I Regulation 
1) History 
The Brussels I Regulation has quite a long history and took various forms before it finally 
ended up as we know it today. The aim was from the beginning to facilitate cross-border 
litigation and therefore cross-border trade by allowing a quick and efficient enforcement of 
judgments rendered in a state different from that where it should be enforced.
15
 At the present 
time the Brussels I Regulation is described as one of the most successful instruments on 




a) Brussels Convention 
The routes of the Brussels I Regulation go back to 1968 when the then six Member States of 
the European Economic Community
17
 (which subsequently became the European Community 
and then the European Union)
 
agreed on the Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and 
enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters
18
 („the Brussels Convention‟). 
This Convention was established with the goal to increase economic efficiency and to 
promote a single market by harmonising the rules on jurisdiction and preventing parallel 
litigation. By including common rules on jurisdiction, rather than only addressing the issue of 
the effect of civil judgements in other Member States, the drafters went beyond the restraining 
                                                 
15
 U Magnus, P Mankowski/ Magnus Brussels I Regulation 7. 
16
 B Hess; T Pfeiffer; P Schlosser The Brussels I Regulation 44/2001 17. 
17
 Belgium, France, (West)Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
18















aim of Art. 293 (ex Art. 220) of the Treaty establishing the European Community
19
 („TEC‟), 
which was the legal basis of the Brussels Convention.  
From the time the Brussels Convention went into force, on 1 February 1973, to 1999 it was 
the sole instrument on European procedural law and due to its comprehensive, uniform and 
autonomous interpretation by the ECJ
20
 one of the most successful conventions in private 
international law. Furthermore, a homogenous application was supported by the official 
expert report of Jenard
21
 which served as a commentary of the Brussels Convention.
22
 New 
Member States were according to Art. 65 of the Brussels Convention required to accept the 
Brussels Convention as part of the Community´s legal order - at least as a basis for 
negotiations. This is the reason why by now five versions of the Brussels Conventions exist. 
Every time new Member States acceded to the European Community, the Convention was 
adapted and ratified by all the old and new Members with some amendme ts.
23
  
Moreover the rules of the Brussels Convention were extended with only slight changes to the 
States belonging to the European Free Trade Association („EFTA‟) by the Lugano 





                                                 
19
 The current version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 29 December 2006, OJ C 321E/37 
can be found on http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:0001:0331:EN:pdf. 
Art. 293 says: „Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each other with a view to 
securing for the benefit of their nationals: [...] - the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal 
recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards.”  
20
 The uniform interpretation was guaranteed by the Protocol on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the 
Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters [1972] OJ L229. 
21
 „Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
of 27 September 1968‟ [1979] OJ C59/1 [hereafter Jenard Report]. 
22
 See preface of the Jenard Report. 
23
 The four so called „accession conventions‟ are the Convention on the accession of  9 October 1978 of the 
Kingdom of Denmark, of Ireland  and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the 
Convention on jurisdiction and enforcements of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol 
on its interpretation by the Court of Justice [1978] OJ L304/11, accompanied by the official expert report of P. 
Schlosser „Report on the Convention on the Accession of the United Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters and to the Protocol on Its Interpretation by the Court of Justice‟ 
[1979] OJ C59/71 [hereafter Schlosser Report]; the Convention on the accession of 25 October 1982 of the 
Hellenic Republic to the Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice Luxembourg [1982] OJ L388/1; the 
Convention on the accession of 26 May 1989 of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the 
Convention on jurisdiction and enforcements of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol 
on its interpretation by the Court of Justice [1989] OJ L285/1 and the Convention the accession of 29 November 
1996 of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden to the Convention on 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its 
interpretation by the Court of Justice [1997] OJ C15/1. 
24















However, unifying the rules of private international law by means of conventions has proved 
inadequate to the task of creating a single market. This is mainly due to the fact that a 
convention, as an instrument agreed on by the single parties, lacks the capacity to bind the 
various legal systems of the Member States which the Community Acts possess.
25
 Moreover 
the necessity of renegotiating every time a new Member States wishes to accede to the EU 
always causes the risk of new compromises and can be very time consuming. 
 
b) Brussels I Regulation 
Since 1997, the last version of the Brussels Convention, the institutional framework had 
changed which led to the fact that the rules were now contained in the form of a regulation 
rather than an international treaty as before. This was due to the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam
26
 in 1999. Based on the new competences of Art. 61 and 65 TEC
27
, the 
European Community has implemented several instruments in the field of civil procedure in 
order to contribute to the development of a European Judicial Area (EJA). The Brussels I 
Regulation was the first of a series of regulations leading to the „europeanisation‟ of private 
international law.
28
 It was issued in 2000 and entered into force on 1 March 2002. The result 
of this new form that the Brussels I Regulation took is that it does not have to be renegotiated 
every time new Member States accede to the EU. In contrast to its predecessor, as a 
regulation, it forms part of the so-called acquis communautaire, which represents the entire 
body of legislation that is in force in the EU and that a new member state receives 
immediately upon accession.
29
 Hence all States that became Member of the European Union 
since 2001
30
 had to accept the Brussels I Regulation as a requirement of membership and it 
became part of their legal system since it is a binding and directly applicable community act. 




                                                 
25
 B Pasa; G Benacchio The Harmonization of Civil and Commercial Law in Europe 271. 
26
 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on the European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities [1997] OJ C340/173. 
27
 Art. 65 in conjunction with Art. 61 (c) states: „…in order to establish progressively an area of freedom, 
security and justice the Council shall adopt measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters as 
provided for in Art. 65”; and under (b) it states that this includes “promoting the compatibility of the rules 
applicable in the Member States concerning the conflict of laws and  of jurisdiction”. 
28
 H van Lith, International Jurisdiction and Commercial Litigation  31. 
29
 T Kruger „Review article – Civil jurisdiction and the issue of legislating for the EU‟ (2010) Vol. 6 No.2 J. 
Priv. Int. L. 501,502. 
30
 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in 
2004 and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. 
31
 Denmark opted out of Titel IV of the EC Treaty, including Art. 65, as stated in Arts. 1 and 2 of the Fifth 















With regard to its content, which was amended at the same time, most of the provisions are 
very similar or in great parts even identical to those of the former Brussels and Lugano 
Convention, on which principles it is based. Nevertheless some changes were made, 
especially with respect to contract jurisdiction. Following this the text of the Lugano 




However, for those EFTA countries which acceded to the EU the Lugano Convention was, as 
a bilateral agreement, superseded by the Brussels I Regulation as far as relations between 
member states are concerned. For relations with other EFTA States, the Lugano Convention 
continues to apply. The same applies to the various versions of the Brussels Conventions.
33
 
Yet, with regard to its interpretation both the ECJ´s interpretation of the unmodified provision 
of the Brussels Convention and its Explanatory Reports shall according to paragraph 19 of the 
preamble of the Brussels I Regulation remain applicable and therefore are still of great 
influence. Moreover, the ECJ continues to play an active role in the unification process as a 




2) Scope of the regulatory provisions 
As mentioned before the Brussels I Regulation determines jurisdiction and provides for the 
free circulation of judgements that are passed within the EU. According to Art. 1 it only 
applies in civil and commercial ma ters and shall not extend to revenue, customs or 
administrative matters.  
In subsequence 2 of Art. 1 som  areas are explicitly excluded from the scope of the Brussels I 
Regulation. One of these exceptions stipulated in Art. 1 (2) (d) is arbitration.
35
 It is not clear 
from the wording how far-reaching this exclusion is supposed to be and whether only the 
                                                                                                                                                        
the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters do not apply to Denmark. The same right was reserved for the 
U.K. and Ireland under Art. 3 of that same Protocol but these countries „opted in‟. See H van Lith, op cit note 28, 
p 32. See the Preamble of the Brussels I Regulation paras (20) and (21). Although the Regulation is not directly 
applicable to Denmark, it has effectively been extended to Denmark by a separate agreement between the EU 
and Denmark (Council Decision 2006/325/EC of 27 April 2006 concerning the conclusion of the agreement 
between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [2006] OJ L120/22) which took effect on 1 July 
2007. 
32
 Council Decision on the signing on behalf of the Community of 10 September 2007, 12247/07, JUSTCIV 218. 
33
 However, according to Art. 68 (1) Brussels I Regulation the Brussels Convention continues to apply with 
respect to those territories of EU countries that fall within its territorial scope and that are excluded from the 
regulation pursuant to Article 299 of the TEC.  
34
 H van Lith, op cit (note 28) p 33. 
35
 Furthermore „[t]he Regulation shall not apply to: (a) the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in 
property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and succession; (b) bankruptcy, proceedings relating to 
the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and 















arbitration proceeding itself or court proceedings that are ancillary or otherwise related to 
arbitration should be captured as well.  Practitioners and academics have discussed a lot about 
the interpretation of the arbitration exclusion and the problem was also addressed in the 
Jenard and Schlosser Report
36
 and continually subject of ECJ judgements, which, however, 




3) Why is arbitration excluded? 
The question that arises, is for which reason arbitration is excluded from the scope of the 
Brussels I Regulation. In order to find an answer one has to go back to the origins of the 
Regulation once more. The Brussels Convention came into existence on the basis of the 
request of Art. 293 (ex Art. 220) TEC
38
, which envisaged the simplification of recognition 
and enforcement of both judgments and arbitral awards. Although the Brussels Convention, 
created on that article, provided for a system of the intra-European recognition and 
enforcement of judgments and even made a step further as it introduced uniform rules of 
international jurisdiction as well, it excluded arbitration from its scope on the other hand.
39
 A 
similar regime in an independent treaty was not created either. Since the legal basis would 
have been expressly given with the then Art. 220 TEC uncertainty concerning the basis of 
authorisation is not the reason for the arbitration exclusion. 
 
One of the main reasons in 1968 for excluding arbitration from the scope of the Brussels 
Convention was the fact that „the Council of Europe ha[d] prepared a European Convention 
providing a uniform law on arbitration‟ that probably would be „accompanied by a protocol 
which would facilitate the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards‟.
40
 However, this 
convention never came into existence since it had only been signed by Austria and Belgium 
and only the latter country has actually ratified it.
41
 
With the failure of the target convention on arbitration the most obvious reason for excluding 
arbitration disappeared at first sight. Nevertheless, the arbitration exception was retained 
when the Brussels Convention was firstly updated in 1979 on the occasion of accession by 
Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark.
42
 The reason given in the Schlosser Report for doing so 
                                                 
36
 Jenard Report, 13; Schlosser Report, 92-93. 
37
 See chapter C) I). 
38
 See B) I) 1) a). 
39
 Art. 1 (4) Brussels Convention. 
40
 See Jenard Report 13. 
41
 H van Houtte „Why not include arbitration in the Brussels Jurisdiction Regulation?‟ (2005) Vol. 13 No. 1 Arb 
Int 510. 
42















was „because all the Member States of the Community, with the exception of Luxembourg 
and Ireland, had in the meantime become parties to the United Nations Convention of 10 June 
1958 on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
43
, and Ireland [was] 
willing to give sympathetic consideration to the question of her acceding to it.‟
44
 The New 
York Convention, which now became the sole reason not to cover arbitration in the Brussels 
Convention, had already been mentioned as a supplementary reason in 1968, though the 




A further presumption which has been raised by academia is the possible lack of familiarity 
with the arbitration process.
46
 In order to support this theory the following example has been 
cited: The European Commission´s Green Paper on Alternative Dispute Resolutions 
(„ADR‟)
47
 excludes arbitration from its scope on the grounds that „arbitration is closer to a 
quasi-judicial procedure than to an ADR as arbitrators' awards replace judicial decisions‟ and 
that „arbitration is the subject of a certain number of legislative instruments in the Member 
States and at an international level, such as the 1958 New York Convention [...] or [...] the 
1966 European Convention providing a Uniform Law on Arbitration.‟
48
 The question whether 
arbitration is in fact more similar to court proceedings than to ADR shall not be addressed 
here. However, since the 1966 Convention never came into existence, the reference to it does 
not appear to be a well-founded explanation and may be indicative of a less profound 
engagement with the functioning of arbitration. 
 
During the preparation of th  Brussels I Regulation the arbitration exception was not 
explicitly discussed anymore
49
 and therefore remained as Art. 1 (2) (d) in the Brussels I 





                                                 
43
 Also known as New York Convention and hereafter NYC. 
44
 Schlosser Report, 92 para 61. 
45
 H van Houtte, op cit (note 41) p 510. 
46
 H van Houtte, op cit (note 41) p 511. 
47
 Green Paper on Alternative Dispute Resolutions in Civil and Commercial Matters  
of 19 April 2002 COM (2002) 196 final. 
48
 Green Paper on ADR op cit (note 47) point 1, 1.1, 2 [2]. 
49
 See Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 















II) Arbitration Laws 
As shown above international arbitration is neither covered by the Brussels I Regulation nor 
by a similar European treaty or regulation. It is not the purpose of this paper to give a detailed 
enumeration and explanation of arbitration laws; nevertheless, the following section shall give 
a rough overview of the laws that might have influence on international arbitration 
proceedings, i.e. those that play a decisive role when it comes to the interface with the 
Brussels I Regulation. 
 
International arbitration involves a multitude of different systems of law or legal rules. In an 
average case it is likely to happen that at least five systems of law have a bearing on the 
arbitration.
50
 These are 1) the law governing the arbitration agreement, 2) the law governing 
the existence and proceedings of the arbitral tribunal, the so called lex arbitri, 3) the 
substantive law, 4) other applicable rules and non-binding guidelines and 5) the law 
governing recognition and enforcement of the award. Most of these laws, i.e. 1) - 4), can be 
chosen by the parties themselves directly or indirectly whilst the winning party who seeks 
enforcement is with regard to the law governing recognition and enforcement solely depended 
on the law of that country were the money or the assets of the losing party are. 
 
For a better understanding of the problematic interface between the Brussels I Regulation and 
arbitration, as it will be shown in chapter C), the following section will briefly focus on the 
law governing recognition and enforcement and the lex arbitri. 
 
1) New York Convention 
The law governing the „recognition and enforcement of the award‟ is the one that immediately 
catches one‟s eye in connection with the Brussels I Regulation on jurisdiction and the 
„recognition and enforcement of judgments‟. Equal to judgments in international law disputes, 
an award issued in one country that is supposed to be enforced in another does not serve its 
purpose if the latter country does not recognise the award, requests a repeated substantive 
examination of the case or requires the arbitral award to first be recognised by the courts of 
the State in which the award was issued. If the losing party does not fulfil its obligations 
arising out of the award voluntarily, the enforcement must take place through the national 
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However, all EU Member States are party to the New York Convention.
52
 With more than 
140 signatories it is the international treaty on the recognition and enforcement of 
international awards with the widest scope of application.
53
 Its‟ very simple but at the same 
time tremendous significance is that it provides for the effectiveness of arbitration agreements 
and for an uncomplicated and effective method of obtaining recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards within all Contracting States. 
The first aspect is dealt with in Art. II which states that Contracting States shall recognise 
arbitration agreements
54
 and that „the court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in 
a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this 
article, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that 
the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed‟.
55
 
Once an award was rendered, the winning party only needs to supply the award and the 
arbitration agreement according to Art. IV NYC and recognition and enforcement can then 
only be refused under the exhaustive grounds listed in Art. V NYC which either have to be 
raised and proofed by the losing party
56
 or can be objected by the enforcing court.
57
 Hence, 
the New York Convention takes a „pro-enforcement approach‟ and provides for an award´s 




The Convention is in existence since 1959 without ever being changed and is described as the 
„the single most important pillar on which the edifice of international arbitration rests‟.
59
 It is 
basically this significant international convention that the arbitration exclusion was intended 





                                                 
51
 N Blackaby; C Partasides, op cit (note 10) at para 11.36. 
52
 List of all member states available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html [accessed 24.11.2010]. 
53
 N Blackaby; C Partasides, op cit (note 10) at para 11.39. 
54
 If it fulfills the requirements listed in Art. II (1) NYC. 
55
 Art. II (3) NYC. 
56
 Grounds listed in Art. V 1 NYC. 
57
 Grounds listed in Art. V 2 NYC. This is the case, if (a) the subject matter of the difference is not capable of 
settlement of arbitration or (b) the recognition and enforcement of the award would be contrary to public policy. 
58
 G Born International Commercial Arbitration Vol II 2711. 
59
 J. G. Wetter „The Present Status of the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC: An Appraisal‟ [1990] 1 
Am Rev Int´l Arb 91. 
60
 C Ambrose „Arbitration and the Free Movement of Judgements‟ (2003) Vol.19 No.1 Arb Int 5; Jenard Report, 















2) Lex arbitri 
Another system of law that is worth to have a closer look at in the context of this paper is the 
lex arbitri. It is the law of the country in whose territory the arbitration takes place and it 
governs the arbitration itself and the way in which it is conducted.
61
 Hence, in contrast to the 




 rules for example 
which are normally expressly chosen by the parties, the lex arbitri is only indirectly 
determined by the choice of the place of arbitration.  
Depending on the respective laws for arbitration of the various countries, the lex arbitri might 
be expected to deal for example with the definition of an arbitration agreement, the 
entitlement of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction, interim measure protection 
and court assistance, to list just a few important aspects.
64
  Although the parties can and often 
do choose procedural rules like the ICC or UNCITRAL rules, the lex arbitri is binding on the 
parties to the extent that it contains mandatory provisions or where the chosen institutional 
rules are silent.
65
 It is therefore advisable for the parties to select their place of arbitration 
carefully with regard to the legal choice they make at the same time. However, this contains 
the benefit that the parties can foresee the courts´ tendency to interfere or the outcome of 
possible court decisions due to the provisions contained in the lex arbitri and the common 
practice of the courts of the respective country.   
In order to illustrate the influence of the lex arbitri the challenge of jurisdiction shall be taken 
as an example. Even though it is widely accepted that a tribunal has the power to rule on its 
own jurisdiction, which is commonly known as the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz 
(competence-competence), the extent of this right may vary from state to state. According to 
the German § 1032 ZPO
66
, which is based on Art. 8 UNCITRAL Model Law
67
, a court before 
which an action is brought in a matter which is subject to an arbitration agreement shall, if a 
party so requests, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is null and 
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. This requires a detailed scrutiny of the 
validity of the arbitration agreement. However, in France a summary review is according to 
Art. 1458 (1) CPC
68
 and its legal interpretation sufficient and if the semblance of an 
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applicable arbitration agreement is given the French courts have to decline jurisdiction and 
leave the final decision to the arbitral tribunal.
69
 Thus, the powers conferred to the courts with 
reference to the decision on the validity of an arbitration agreement can vary considerably 
depending on the applicable lex arbitri. 
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C) Interface of Brussels I and Arbitration proceedings 
 
As shown above, the rules of jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in Europe are regulated by the Brussels I Regulation. The recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards are based on the New York Convention and apart from that, various other 
legal systems govern international arbitration.
70
  
On first sight it may seem questionable why the Brussels I Regulation might be amended to 
the effect that arbitration should in some way be taken into account. In order to be able to 
answer this question, it is important to analyse what, and as the case may be, where the 
interface between the regulation and arbitration proceedings is and what problems may arise 
due to the arbitration exclusion.  
 
 
I) Scope of the arbitration exclusion 
The first requirement for a smooth operation of a legal act, treaty or regulation is that its scope 
is clearly defined. However, this is not the case for the arbitration exclusion in Art. 1 (2) (d). 
Its extent has first in the Brussels Convention and later in the Brussels I Regulation always 
been subject to discussion and controversy. This concerns in particular the question to what 
extent proceedings in front of national courts which are somehow linked to the arbitration 
proceedings fall under the arbitration exception. Depending on the answer thereon, different 
rules of jurisdiction are applicable and the judgment either benefits or not from the 
advantageous recognition and enforcement system of the Brussels I Regulation. 
 
1) Initial uncertainties 
a) Jenard, Schlosser and Evrigenis-Kerameus Report 
Due to the remarks set out in the Jenard Report, it was clear from the very beginning in 1968 
that the Brussels Convention does not apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards and for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals in respect of 
litigation relating to arbitration.
71
 For the latter case proceedings setting aside awards were 
taken as an example. In 1978 when the Brussels Convention was revised on the occasion of 
the accession of the U.K., Ireland and Denmark it was agreed that the text of the exception 
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should not be amended.
72
 However, the Schlosser Report which accompanied the accession 
convention specified the scope of the arbitration exception a little bit towards a broad 
application in reaction to the discussion which had arisen. Two positions had basically been 
emerged; the first one, mainly represented by the U.K., was in favour of a very extensive 
interpretation. The proponents of this view were of the opinion that the provision covers all 
disputes which the parties had agreed to be settled by arbitration including any secondary 
disputes connected with the arbitration. The other point of view expressed on behalf of the 
original Member States, is that the exception only regards proceedings before national courts 
as part of arbitration if they refer to arbitration proceedings.
73
 The Schlosser Report points out 
that the Brussels Convention does not cover „court proceedings which are ancillary to 
arbitration proceedings, for example the appointment or dismissal of arbitrators, the fixing of 
the place of arbitration, the extension of the time limit for making awards or the obtaining of a 
preliminary ruling on questions of substance‟. The same applies to „a judgment determining 
whether an arbitration agreement is valid or not, or because it is invalid ordering the parties 
not to continue the arbitration proceedings‟.
74
 Excluded from the scope of the Brussels 
Convention are furthermore „proceedings and decisions concerning applications for the 
revocation, amendment recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards‟.
75
 It seems 
reasonable that these arbitration-related proceedings are excluded from the Brussels 
Convention. The application of its general grounds for jurisdiction
76
 would lead to unpractical 
jurisdictions. This applies especially for the basic rule laid down in Art. 2, which establishes 
that persons shall be sued in the courts of the state in which they are domiciled. However, in 
international arbitration the seat is generally in a neutral third country, which rather qualifies 
the courts of that state since they have usually the closer connection to the events. 
 
With the accession of Greece in 1982 the last expert report dealing with the Arbitration 
exception was issued.
77
 The Evrigenis-Kerameus Report reflects the fact that in practice the 
issue of whether there is a valid arbitration agreement can arise in two different ways. Either it 
represents the main claim, e.g. if a party claimed a declaration that the arbitration agreement 
validly exists, or is it raised as a preliminary or incidental issue typically in form of a 
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jurisdictional challenge raised by the defendant. In the first scenario the proceedings are not 





b) Validity of the arbitration agreement - Marc Rich case 
In spite of these guidelines set out in the expert reports, uncertainty about the exclusion´s 
scope remained. Hence, in 1991 the ECJ was concerned with the specific scope of the 
arbitration exclusion in Marc Rich and further specified it.
79
 This case dealt with the question 
whether the Brussels Convention covers court proceedings to appoint an arbitrator when the 
defendant alleges that a valid arbitration agreement does not exist. Hence, it incidentally 
addressed the issue of whether the decision about the validity of an arbitration agreement as a 
preliminary question falls within the scope of the arbitration exception of the then Art. 1 (4) 
Brussels Convention and therefore not within the scope of the Convention. 
 
In 1998 Marc Rich and Impianti entered into a contract on the sale of Iranian crude. After 
both parties had agreed on certain amendments to the first offer, Marc Rich sent a telex 
message setting out the terms of the contract including one clause concerning „law and 
arbitration‟.
80
 After the loading of the oil had been completed, Marc Rich complained that the 
Cargo was contaminated. Thereupon Impianti summoned Marc Rich to appear before the 
Regional Court in Genoa, Italy, who contested the court´s jurisdiction, relying on the 
arbitration clause. Almost at the same time he commenced arbitration proceedings in London, 
in which Impianti in turn refused to take part. As a result Marc Rich instituted proceedings 
before the High Court of Justice in London for the appointment of an arbitrator in accordance 
with the English Arbitration Act of 1950. Impianti objected to the court´s jurisdiction with the 
argument that the dispute did not concern arbitration itself but the existence of a valid 
arbitration agreement. Hence, as an incidental issue it would not fall under the arbitration 
exclusion of Art. 1 (4) and the issue had to be decided in Italy according to the Brussels 
Convention. 
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The ECJ ruled that „[a]rticle 1 (4) of the Brussels Convention must be interpreted as meaning 
that the exclusion provided for therein extends to litigation pending before a national court 
concerning the appointment of an arbitrator, even if the existence or validity of an arbitration 
agreement is a preliminary issue to that litigation.‟
81
  It argues that the determination of 
whether a dispute falls within the scope, reference must be made „solely to the subject matter 
of the dispute‟.
82
 The subject matter is the appointment of an arbitrator, which is a measure of 
setting arbitration proceedings in motion and therefore doubtlessly „ancillary‟ to arbitration 
and thus excluded from the scope of the Brussels Convention. Despite its first appearance the 
decision is not inconsistent with the guidelines set out in the Evrigenis-Kerameus Report. 
Indeed the Report says that the verification of the validity of an arbitration agreement as an 
incidental question must be considered as falling within the scope of the Brussels 
Convention.
83
 However, this applies to cases where the invalidity is raised as an objection 
during proceedings falling with regard to their nature (e.g. a claim for the contractually owned 
performance) under the scope of the Convention, which was not the case in Marc Rich. The 
pure fact that the preliminary issue relates to the validity of the arbitration agreement does not 
affect the exclusion from the scope of the Brussels Convention of a dispute which´s subject-




Besides the clear and broad interpretation of Art. 1 (4)
85
 the ECJ stated in this decision that it 
depends only on the subject matter of the main claim and not on the objections to that claim 
for determining whether the claim falls under the arbitration exception. 
 
The result of such proceedings not falling under the Brussels Conventions leads to the fact 
that the lis pendens rule
86
 does not apply and that proceedings seeking the appointment of 
arbitrators do not have to be stayed because of the previously introduced proceedings on the 
merits of the case.
 87
 While this on the one hand strengthens arbitration, on the other hand it 
opens the floodgate for parallel proceedings and incompatible outcomes, since it makes it 
possible that the arbitration goes ahead while the court first seized may rule that the 
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arbitration agreement is invalid and gives a judgment on the merits contrary to the arbitral 
award. 
 
c) Protective measures - van Uden 
A further case that followed up with the ambit of the arbitration exception was the van Uden 
case.
88
 This decision dealt with the question whether provisional or protective measures in 
cases in which proceedings may be or have already been initiated before arbitrators fall within 
the arbitration exception. 
 
Arbitration proceedings had according to the arbitration agreement already been initiated by 
the Dutch carrier van Uden in the Netherlands for unpaid dept with a slot charter agreement 
when the claimant additionally applied to the national court in Rotterdam for an interim 
injunction securing the same dept. The defendant, a German company named Deco Line, 
objected to the Dutch court´s jurisdiction on grounds that under the Brussels Convention it 
should be sued in Germany as its´ place of domicile. Hence, the question was to what extent 
the fact that the claim for the debt was the subject of n arbitration agreement had an impact 
on the jurisdiction of the national court under the Convention. 
 
The ECJ again pointed out that the intention of Art. 1 (4) of the Brussels Convention was „to 
exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts‟ and 
referred in this respect to its judgment in Marc Rich.
89
 It further said that „it must be noted in 
that regard that provisional measures are not in principle ancillary to arbitration proceedings 
but are ordered in parallel to such proceedings and are intended as measures of support. […] 
Their place in the scope of the Convention is thus determined not by their own nature but by 
the nature of the rights which they serve to protect„.
90
 The right to be protected was one 
conferred by a contract. Hence, the own nature of the right falls within the scope of the 
Brussels Convention which as a consequence make the interim measures trying to protect this 
right falling under the application of the Convention as well. Due to the fact that the right 
which the interim measure tries to protect is not within the sphere of arbitration the interim 
measure cannot be described as „ancillary‟ to arbitration. 
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The ECJ made clear in its decision that the Brussels Convention applies whenever the subject 
matter of the provisional measure concerns the performance of the contractual obligation 
itself and does not concern the arbitration proceedings. The fact that the contractual issue was 
supposed to be resolved by arbitration is not decisive. By referring to the nature of the right 
which shall be protected as the determining factor
91
 the ECJ takes up its decision in Marc 




However, the distinction between proceedings that are „ancillary‟ and those which are 
„parallel‟ to arbitration is unfortunate and may contribute to confusion.
93
 It seems difficult to 
draw a clear line e.g. when provisional measures deal with the submission of evidence to the 





According to the judgment the Brussels Convention does not prevent courts, without any 
territorial link or other restriction, from taking provisional measures that cross arbitration 
proceedings in other Member States.
95
 This leads to the questionable outcome that only the 
provisional measure would fall within the scope of the Convention, because the main claim is 
subject to an arbitration agreement. Moreover this result is an incentive for seeking such 
measures at a court within the EU due to the fact that such a measure can be enforced 
anywhere else in the EU but not automatically elsewhere pursuant to the New York 
Convention.
96
 Especially where such measures virtually anticipate the final ruling, the 
application undermines the parties‟ decision to refer their dispute to arbitration and to have 
interim measures issued in accordance with the lex arbitri, which they have chosen by 
locating the seat of arbitration. 
 
2) Remaining problems 
Although the expert reports have started to give a guideline for the interpretation of the 
arbitration exclusion and the ECJ has given two important decisions concerning its scope, not 
all problematic aspects could have been solved and thus there are still some points that remain 
unclear.  
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First of all the different terms used for the delimitation whether proceedings fall within or 
without the scope of the Brussels Convention lead to confusion and demarcation problems. 
Thus in the Evrigenis-Kerameus Report a distinction was made between „principal‟ and 
„incidental‟ issues
97
, in Marc Rich decision between „subject matter‟ and „preliminary‟ issue
98
 
and finally the ECJ in van Uden draw the line between „ancillary‟ and „parallel‟ 
proceedings.
99
 Besides, neither the judgment in van Uden nor the Schlosser report define the 
term „ancillary‟ abstractly but only give examples.
100
 This leads to legal uncertainty in cases 
which are even just slightly different from the selected examples. 
 
Moreover the ECJ decisions induce practical problems. While van Uden somehow weakens 
the parties´ choice of the lex arbitri
101
, the decision in Marc Rich leads to or at least does not 
prevent parallel proceedings.
102
 The same applies to declaratory judgments on the validity. 
Such judgments are not recognised under the Brussels Convention since they do not fall under 
its scope of application as clearly set out in the Evrigenis-Kerameus Report. Thus, if one party 
is not satisfied with the court´s decision it can still let a court of another Member State decide 
on the same question.  
 
It should be noted at this point that the adoption of the Brussels I Regulation is without 
prejudice to the explanations issued under the Brussels Convention. This follows from the fact 
that the arbitration exception was not modified when the Convention was converted in a 
Regulation. According to Art. 19 of the preamble of the Regulation the interpretation of the 
Brussels Convention both by th  ECJ and expert reports should therefore remain applicable.  
 
 
II) Parallel proceedings 
A severe problem of the arbitration exclusion, which was even encouraged by the Marc Rich 
judgment, is that it opens the possibility for parallel proceedings. While a court generally 
competent under the Brussels I Regulation may commence proceedings at the investigation of 
the claimant, the respondent can institute arbitration proceedings in another Member State. If 
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the arbitral tribunal considers the arbitration agreement valid, it will render its award 
regardless of the court proceedings. This is in contradiction with the general aim in the EU of 
a harmonious administration of justice within the EU.
103
 Besides the risk of contradictory 
decisions that might occur, the duplication of work causes a waste of resources and makes 
parallel proceedings very undesirable. Moreover, to possibility of parallel proceedings is an 
incentive for parties who want to delay a process. It is common that a party in such a case 
sues the other party on purpose in front of court that is known for its long processing times 




1) Art. II (3) New York Convention 
Reading Art. II (3) NYC parallel proceedings should at first sight actually not be possible. 
Under this article a court before which an action is brought in breach of a valid arbitration 
agreement must decline jurisdiction, unless the arbitration agreement is void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed. Although the New York Convention provides for a rule that 
imposes a duty on the courts of the Contracting States to recognise arbitration agreements and 
consequently to refer to arbitration it is, however, insufficient to fully deal with parallel 
proceedings since it does not provide for coordination between arbitration and litigation.
105
 As 
a result both institutions will continue with their proceedings, if the court finds the arbitration 
agreement to be void but the tribunal does not. The New York Convention does not say 
whether one should decide first as a general principle or which law is applicable for this 
question.
106
 Thus, an avoidance of parallel proceedings cannot be achieved by Art. II (3). 
 
 
2) Anti-suit injunctions 
A common strategy in common law jurisdictions to address this problem is by way of anti-
suit injunctions.
107
 An anti-suit injunction is an order issued by a court that prevents an 
opposing party from commencing or continuing a proceeding in another jurisdiction.
108
 In the 
context of arbitration agreements the substantive interest in that sense is the right not to 
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invoke a jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation but instead to have all disputes 
determined by arbitration.
109
 Such an injunction is not directed against the foreign court itself 
but against the other party and its non-observance is seen as a contempt of court and entails 
penalties up to imprisonment and attachment of the respondent´s assets.
110
 Since it does not 
interfere with the sovereignty of the foreign court directly but only tries to influence the 




However, anti-suit injunctions have always been subject to controversial discussions. Whilst 
on the one hand it provides for a mechanism scotching claims which´s only aim it is to 
torpedothe procedure before the competent court or arbitral tribunal it can also hinder 
procedures before a court that do is the competent court or the tribunal on which the parties 




a) Anti-suit injunctions and the Brussels I Regulation 
Although the Brussels I Regulation does not contain any explicit reference to anti-suit 
injunctions, such injunctions rendered within the EU are contrary to the principle of mutual 




The principle of mutual trust was already pointed out in the ECJ´s decision in Gasser.
114
 
Although the case itself was not concerned with anti-suit injunctions as such but rather with 
the lis pendens rule under Art. 21 of the Brussels Convention
115
, the problem was quite 
similar. The ECJ had to decide whether an exception of Art. 21 can be made if the claimant 
has brought proceedings in bad faith before a court without jurisdiction and that court first 
seized has not decided the question of its jurisdiction within a reasonable time. The ECJ stated 
that due to the principle of mutual trust the Contracting States have to trust each other´s legal 
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system and judicial institution and are not allowed to ignore Art. 21 even if the court first 




Finally, with the decision in the Turner case the ECJ could explicitly overturn the practice of 
the English courts by declaring anti-suit injunctions within the EU illegal.
117
 In this case the 
English court, being the court first seized, issued an anti-suit injunction in order to restrain the 
other party from continuing proceedings it had commenced in Spain. The ECJ again pointed 
out with reference to its judgment in Gasser the principle of mutual trust on which the 
Brussels Convention is based.
118
 Hence, „every prohibition imposed by a court restraining a 
party from commencing or continuing proceedings before a foreign court undermines the 
latter jurisdiction to determine the dispute‟.
119
 This applies even where the party against 





The practice of issuing anti-suit injunctions within countries falling under the scope of the 
Brussels Convention was conclusively rejected by this judgment. The reason behind it is that 
the Regulation provides a complete set of uniform rules on the allocation of jurisdiction 
between the courts of the Member States, which must trust each other to apply those rules 
correctly.  
 
b) Anti-suit injunctions in connection with arbitration – West Tanker 
However, the Turner case was not concerned with arbitration. The question if the principle 
laid down in this decision could be adopted for a scenario where a court issues such an 





With a highly controversial decision
123
 the ECJ declared anti-suit injunctions relating 
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to the protection of arbitration agreements as incompatible with the Brussels I Regulation as 
well. 
 
In this case a vessel owned by West Tanker and chartered by Erg Petroli Spa collided with a 
jetty owned my Erg in Italy in August 2000. The charter agreement contained a clause 
providing for arbitration in England. Erg claimed compensation from its insurers Allianz and 
Generali and commenced arbitration proceedings in London against West Tankers for the 
excess that was not covered by the insurance contract. However, Allianz and Generali after 
having paid Erg compensation under the insurance policies brought court proceedings against 
West Tankers before the Tribunale di Siracusa in Italy due to their right of subrogation to 
Erg´s claim in order to recover the sums they paid to Erg. West Tanker raised an objection of 
lack of jurisdiction on the basis of the existence of the arbitration agreement and at the same 
time began proceedings before the High Court in England seeking an injunction restraining 
Allianz and Generali from continuing their proceedings in Italy. The High Court of Justice of 
England and Wales granted the anti-suit injunction in accordance with the common practice in 
English courts.
124
 On appeal, the House of Lords referred the question of the consistency of 
the injunction with the Brussels I Regulation to the ECJ. 
 
The ECJ denied such consistency and therefore extended its findings in Turner to injunctions 
in protection of arbitration agreements, however, with a very surprising explanation. The 
original divergence in academia was whether injunctions restraining a breach of an arbitration 
agreement fall within the arbitration exception. The further question whether such an 
injunction was moreover irreconcilable with the Regulation was only raised under the 




However, the judgment excluded the anti-suit injunction from the scope of the Brussels I 
Regulation but nevertheless came to the conclusion that it undermines the Regulation´s 
effectiveness.
126
 The ECJ argued for his conclusion by means of a tactical manoeuvre. To 
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begin with, the court referred to the proceedings on the merits before the court in Italy, which 
are covered by the Brussels I Regulation.
127
  
Following the aforementioned, the ECJ concluded that the English injunction hindered the 
Italian court to exercise its jurisdiction given under the Brussels I Regulation and to decide 
about the validity and scope of the arbitration agreement itself.
128
 Hence the anti-suit 
injunction, although outside the Regulation itself, affects the proceedings in Italy and 
intervenes with the Italian court´s rights given under the Regulation. The ECJ supported its 
finding by referring to Art. II (3) NYC, which entitles a court seized to examine the validity of 




With this argumentation the ECJ widens the scope of application of the Brussels I Regulation 
to a new extent: it does not just cover proceedings falling under their scope anymore but also 
such proceedings which only affect the Regulation.
130
 Some commentators see this as a 
disproportionate limitation of the arbitration exclusion in favour of the ECJ´s aim of the 
„unification of rules of conflict of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters and the free 




 Moreover the ECJ´s reference to the principal 
of „mutual trust‟ in this constellation is criticised. This would presume that one court 
operating outside the scope of the Regulation and therefore not bound by its regime is 
nevertheless bound by the principles underlying this regime.
133
 In addition the decision does 
not respect the parties´ choice of the lex arbitri by not giving the forum expressly chosen 
priority. In contrast, others support the judgment from a more practical point of view, arguing 
that anti-suit injunctions constitute an indirect interference with court proceedings which is 




Yet, the mass of criticism and the multitude of written articles on this highly contentious 
judgment do not change the fact that the EU Member States are de facto bound by this 
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decision and have to deal with its consequences
135
 unless the legislator amends the Brussels I 
Regulation in order to attenuate the effects of the judgment.  
 
c) Significance for practice 
Following from West Tanker anti-suit injunctions are no longer a possibility to oppose parallel 
proceedings. While the court may consider the arbitration agreement invalid and consequently 
continues proceedings and delivers a judgment on the merits, the arbitral tribunal may come 
to an opposite decision and issue an award incompatible with the court judgment. 
 
Furthermore the decision confers decisive rights to the court competent under the Brussels I 
Regulation. One of the central questions in this decision was which court is the one competent 
to decide whether a claim falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement or not. This 
question is essential. Due to the fact that a party who wants to avoid arbitration only needs to 
raise the objection that the agreement is void or does not cover the claim in question, it is of 
particular importance who has the power to decide on the validity and scope of the arbitration 
agreement. The judgment in West Tanker awards this competence to the court competent 




However, the fact that even before West Tanker anti-suit injunctions within the EU were 
consequently denied by civil law jurisdictions, which form the majority, should not be 
overlooked.
137
 The problem of parallel proceedings and torpedo claims shall not be 
underestimated and diminished by that fact; however, it is not a brand new dilemma in the EU 
triggered by this judgment as it sometimes may appear with regard to the discussions on that 
case. Nevertheless, for London as an important place of arbitration in Europe the decision 
may cause a huge loss of attractiveness. 
 
3) Effet négative de la compétence-compétence 
Another way of facing the problem of parallel proceedings is on ground of the principle of the 
„effet négative de la compétence-compétence‟ (negative effect of competence-competence) 
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which is a standard practice in French courts. As mentioned above
138
 France does not only 
allow arbitral tribunals to decide on their jurisdiction
139
 but also awards a negative effect to 
the principle of competence-competence by prohibiting courts from making any 
determination on the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal before it has done so itself.  In contrast 
to the positive effects of competence-competence which does similar to Art. II (3) of the New 
York Convention provides for the respect for the tribunal´s areas of responsibility but not for 
any coordination between court and arbitral proceedings
140
, the negative effect clearly gives 
priority to the tribunal to decide about the validity of the arbitration agreement. 
French courts used this principle of the „effet négative de la compétence-compétence‟ also on 
an international level by applying it both, in international cases where French law was 
applicable and in cases, where the place of arbitration was outside France.
141
 Yet, after West 
Tanker the universal interpretation of the negative competence-competence would most 
probably not stand up to scrutiny by the ECJ anymore since it allows the courts expressly to 





At the moment there does not exist a valid and effective way to avoid or prohibit parallel 
proceedings within the EU. The instruments used in England and France, allowed on the basis 
of their national laws, have lapsed due to the ECJ decision in West Tanker. The judgment 
does not allow for an interference of the court´s right to decide on its own jurisdiction under 
the Brussel I Regulation in any way. Hence, this again paves the way for the opportunity of 
torpedoing and tactically delaying proceedings by picking a court under the Brussels I 
Regulation which is known for its slow processing times. Even though these courts might not 
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III) Judgments in breach of arbitration agreements 
A problem closely related to the one of parallel proceedings is the handling of judgments 
delivered in breach of an arbitration agreement at the enforcement stage. According to the 
interpretation of the scope of the arbitration exception
143
 there is at present some consensus 
that a judgment rendered in disregard of an arbitration agreement is covered by the 
Regulation.
144
 Moreover scholars broadly accepted that Title III on „recognition and 
enforcement‟ of the then Brussels Convention does not correspond to Title II „jurisdiction‟ 
with the effect that a court enforcing a judgment does not take into consideration the grounds 
for jurisdiction of the court of origin anymore.
145
 Consequently a judgment is enforceable 
within the EU under the Brussels I Regulation even if it was rendered in disregard of a valid 
arbitration clause.  
This being a highly unsatisfying result has induced academia to find the following legal 
possibilities to circumvent such an outcome. 
 
1) Non-recognition in accordance with Art. 71 (1) Brussels I Regulation 
Some authors suggest that non-recognition should be based on Art. 71 (1) Brussels I 
Regulation. It follows from that provision, which gives precedence to specific conventions, 
that the Regulation is not intended to affect existing treaties. Hence, in order to avoid a 
conflict with obligations under the New York Convention, its Art. II (3) superseded the 
Brussels I Regulation.
146
 Although this approach is consistent with the arbitration exception´s 
intention to avoid conflict with the New York Convention, it is, nevertheless, legally not well 
founded.
147
 It follows from both the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation that 
their subordination only applies where another convention lays down conditions for the 
recognition and enforcements of judgments.
148
 Yet, the New York Convention simply requires 
courts to refer disputes to arbitration if a respective clause exists but does not provide for 
jurisdictional rules or those of recognition of judgments.
149
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2) Public policy 
Another basis on which non-recognition is attempted to be justified, is on grounds of public 
policy.
150
 Accordingly, a recognising court can scrutinise on its own whether a case comes 
within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation and may refuse recognition if it comes to the 
conclusion that a valid arbitration agreement exists and its disregard is thus a violation of 
public policy according to Art. 34 (1) Brussels I Regulation.
151
 The strong and inevitable 
argument against this opinion is Art. 35 (3) Brussels I Regulation. This article precludes a 
revision of the jurisdiction by the recognizing court in general and even specifically mentions 
the test of public policy referred to in Art. 34 (1) in this regard as not applicable. 
 
3) Résumé 
The arbitration exception thus not only allows for parallel arbitration and court proceedings 
but also for the enforcement of court judgments on the merits in other Member States that 
may clash with an arbitral award that can also be enforced in that Member State.
152
 Neither 
Art. 71 (1), nor public policy arguments provide a legal ground for refusing a judgment 
delivered in breach of an arbitration agreement. Apart from that, there is a move within the 





 Citizens and businesses in the EU, which provides an internal 
market without frontiers, shall no longer have to undergo the time consuming and expensive 
procedure of getting a declaration of enforceability.
155
 This would result in the fact that a 
judgment rendered in an EU Member State is automatically enforceable in another Member 
State without being subject to an examination for possible grounds for refusal anymore. 
Assumed that this idea will prevail, there also would no longer be a scope for refusal for 
judgments rendered in breach of an arbitration agreement anyway.  
 
The shown interfaces between the Brussels I Regulation illustrate the problems which may 
arise and which are able to delay und complicate arbitration proceedings and make it more 
costly. Hence, it is not surprising that a resolution for the indicated difficulties is discussed by 
practitioners and academia. 
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D) Proposed Changes 
 
Although the Brussels I Regulation is generally described as a highly successful piece of EU 
legislation
156
 there are areas which could be improved as the last chapter has shown. The 
problems in connection with the arbitration exclusion have undoubtedly existed already for a 
long time but with the continuously increasing popularity of international arbitration and the 
recent West Tanker decision the interface with the Brussels I Regulation became more 
significant. In order to be able to meet these constantly changing requirements in practise, 
legislation always needs to be kept up to date. Before the issuing of the Brussels I Regulation 
the necessary renegotiations under the Brussels Convention every time a new State acceded to 
the EC were taken as an opportunity to reconsider and change the Convention according to 
demand.
157
 Since the Regulation forms now part of the acquis communautaire renegotiations 
do not take place anymore. However, the EU legislator was aware of the need for updated 
legislation. According to Art. 73 of the Brussels I Regulation the European Commission is 
supposed to issue a report on the efficiency of its applications no later than five years after its 
entry into force in 2002. 
 
Somewhat belatedly such a Report
158
 was published on 21 April 2009 together with the Green 
Paper on the Brussels I Regulation
159
. Whereas the Report summarises the examined 
difficulties with regard to the application of the Brussels I Regulation, the Green Paper 
released by the European Commission is a discussion document intended to stimulate debate 
and launch a process of broad consultation, at a European level, on possible ways to improve 
the operation of the Regulation with respect to the concrete raised questions based on the 
Report.
160





Within the consultation period which ended on 30 June 2009 the European Commission 
received 130 contributions from Member States, national and regional authorities, third 
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countries, international organisations, practitioners and academics.
162
 After the consideration 
of all these reactions the Commission published a concrete proposal for a revised „Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council in jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters‟
163





It is now for the European Parliament to adopt the Proposal and for the Council of Ministers 
to approve it under the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision); however, proposals for 
changes or even a denial of the amendment of the Regulation, which would have the effect 
that the Regulation would stay in force in its current version, are possible as well.
164
 The final 
decision is expected within two to three years.  
 
Whilst all reports and papers are obviously concerned with a possible improvement of the 
Brussels I Regulation in general, this paper will concentrate only on the evaluation and 
proposals concerned with the interface between the Brussels I Regulation and arbitration. This 
chapter shall illustrate the different approaches and their scientific basis beginning with the 
Heidelberg Report up to the recently published Proposal. 
 
 
I) Heidelberg Report 
In preparation of the Green Paper the Commission tendered an evaluation with which the 
„Institute of Foreign and International Private and Economic Law‟ of the University of 
Heidelberg in Germany was commissioned. The resulting report, called the Heidelberg 







1) The study´s results 
The clear answer from the research done was that the overwhelming majority of persons 
interviewed is of the opinion that the Brussels I Regulation is a „well-balanced instrument on 
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judicial cooperation which works efficiently‟ although some provisions and the case law of 




In dealing with the arbitration exclusion in Art. 1 (2) (d) the Heidelberg Report recognises the 
difficulties concerning the determination of its scope. It reflects the most important of the 
ECJ´s decisions in that context
168
 and summarises that they created some clarity on the one 
hand but that the complete exclusion of arbitration has also lead to increasing criticism in the 
legal literature.
169
 Nevertheless a possible extension of the Brussels I Regulation to arbitration 





The main point of criticism that was expressed is the possibility of parallel proceedings and 
the resulting question of the handling of judgments disregarding the existence of arbitration 
agreements. Such a situation may occur with judgments on the validity of an arbitration 
agreement due to the fact that these judgments fall outside the scope of the Brussels I 
Regulation and are therefore not recognised under its Art. 32 et seq. Consequently the 
arbitration clause may be seen as valid in one but void in another Member State.
171
 Although 
this reality is found unsatisfactory it seems to arise only rarely in practise.
172
  
It was proposed to include such decisions in the scope of the Brussels I Regulation by deleting 
the arbitration exclusion in Art. 1 (2) (d).
173
 However, under these circumstances a rule was 
demanded in order to avoid forum shopping within the countries of the Member States. It was 
mentioned that a party of an arbitration agreement should generally be protected from being 
sued in any ordinary jurisdiction, particularly a „foreign‟ court without any connection to the 
arbitration. Proposed was an obligation for courts to stay their proceedings once proceedings 
for declaratory relief are already instituted in the country of the place of the arbitration.
174
 The 
Heidelberg Report denies the partly expressed fear that the New York Convention could be 
touched thereby with the explanation that its´ prevalence would be secured by Art. 71 
Brussels I Regulation. Furthermore, the deletion would not lead to an extension to arbitration 
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proceedings themselves since they could still not be qualified as „court‟ proceedings and 




A deletion of the arbitration exception would also include ancillary proceedings in its scope of 
application. Some legal writers even suggested addressing arbitration „positively‟ by giving 
the state courts of the seat of arbitration exclusive jurisdiction for ancillary proceedings.
176
  
Moreover the idea of implementing an article that addresses the formal validity of an 
arbitration agreement was suggested.
177
 Hence this question would be regulated on a 
community level with the consequence that an agreement valid under that law would also be 
valid for courts of all Member States. Yet this suggestion raises difficulties. Besides the 
criticised direct overlapping with Art. II NYC, precisely the regulation of this question on a 





The last interface between the Brussels I Regulation and arbitration relates to recognition and 
enforcement. In order to avoid that an arbitral award and a judgment on the same issue can 
both be enforced
179
, it was proposed to either assimilate arbitral awards with judgments and 
hence to decline enforcement of court judgments on grounds of Art. 34 (3), (4) Brussels I 





2) Proposal given by the Heidelberg Report 
In spite of the shown dissatisfaction the clear reaction of the national reporters was not to 
change the present situation.
181
 Nevertheless the Heidelberg report seems to see slight changes 
indispensible.  
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a) Deletion o the arbitration exclusion 
It proposes either „to delete Article 1 (2) (d) JR
182
 and to preserve the prevalence of the New 
York Convention by Art. 71 JR‟ or „to include a specific provision on supportive proceedings 




b) Exclusive jurisdiction in ancillary proceedings 
Concretely proposed is an Art. 22 (6) that addresses an exclusive jurisdiction for ancillary 
proceedings, read as follows: „The following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, 
regardless of domicile, […] (6) in ancillary proceedings concerned with the support of 
arbitration the courts of the Member State in which the arbitration takes place.‟
184
 Moreover 
some guideline for a uniform determination of the place of arbitration possibly aligned to Art. 
20 of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration would be 
needed if the place is not determined in the agreement.
185
 A new recital with the following 
wording is suggested: „The place of arbitration shall depend on the agreement of the parties 
or determined by the arbitral tribunal. Otherwise, the court of the Capital of the designated 
Member State shall be competent. Lacking such a designation the court shall be competent 





c) Lis pendes rule taking arbitration into account 
In order to regulate the situation of concurring litigation on the validity of the arbitration 
agreement, the inclusion of an Art. 27 A is suggested „A court of a Member State shall stay 
the proceedings once the defendant contests the jurisdiction of the court with respect to 
existence and scope of an arbitration agreement if a court of the Member State that is 
designated as place of arbitration in the arbitration agreement is seized for declaratory relief 
in respect to the existence, the validity and/or the scope of that arbitration.‟
187
 This 
mandatory rule serves to avoid parallel litigation and gives priority to the courts of the place 
of arbitration. 
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II) Green Paper 
On the basis of the Heidelberg Report the European Commission drew up the Report on the 
application of the Brussels I Regulation accompanied with the Green Paper. The Report also 
points out that the Brussels I Regulation is a highly successful instrument, which has 
facilitated cross-border litigation and is broadly appreciated among practitioners, which, 
however, does not exclude that it may be improved.
188
 Following that, the Green Paper 
provides eight questions regarding possible amendments accompanied with explanations and 
own suggestions for improvement by the European Commission itself. The question raised in 
the context of possible modifications concerning arbitration is to be found under number 7. It 
asks:  
  ‘Which action do you consider appropriate at Community level: 
 To strengthen the effectiveness of arbitration agreements;  
 To ensure a good coordination between judicial and arbitration 
proceedings, 
 To enhance the effectiveness of arbitration awards?’ 
 
The Report itself names many of the problems, emphasised in chapter C and adds that 
recognition and enforcement under the New York Convention is considered less swift and 
efficient than the recognition of judgments under the Brussels I Regulation.
189
 The Green 
Paper again elaborates on these problems arising from the interface between the Brussels I 
Regulation and arbitration in more detail and shows different possibilities how to amend the 
Regulation in this respect.
190
 All suggested amendments take into account that arbitration has 
become a matter of great importance to international commerce and that arbitration 
agreements should as a consequence be given the fullest possible effect. Besides, the Green 
Paper reports that the New York Convention is generally perceived to operate satisfactorily 
and is broadly accepted and appreciated among practitioners. The drafters therefore take the 
view that it seems appropriate to leave the operation of the New York Convention untouched 
but to address certain specific points relating to arbitration in the Regulation to ensure the 
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1) Deletion of the arbitration exclusion 
The first proposal is (at least a partial) deletion of the arbitration exclusion laid down in Art. 1 
(2) (d), which would lead to the fact that court proceedings in support of arbitration come 
within the scope of the Regulation. In this respect the Green Paper reflects the view in the 
Heidelberg Report, although the reference to a „partial deletion‟ is new but unfortunately not 
further specified.  
The Green Paper notes that a deletion of Art. 1 (2) (d) could ensure that all the Regulation´s 
jurisdiction rules apply for the issuance of provisional measures in support of arbitration.
192
 
Moreover court decisions rendered in arbitration matters could benefit from the simplified 
rules of recognition set out in the regulation. Namely the recognition of judgments on the 
validity of an arbitration agreement and those setting aside arbitral awards would be allowed 
with the effect of preventing parallel proceedings with possible different outcomes. Hence, 
such an amendment is described as a good possibility to improve the interface of arbitration 
and court proceedings. 
 
2) Exclusive jurisdiction in ancillary supportive proceedings 
The Green Paper also picks up on the recommended rule allocating jurisdiction in ancillary 
supportive proceedings in order to enhance legal certainty.
193
 It suggests granting exclusive 
jurisdiction to the courts of the Member States of the place of arbitration along with the 




3) Priority rule for courts of th  seat of arbitration 
The Report points out the aim of a better coordination between proceedings concerning the 
validity of an arbitration agreement which might be brought before a court and at the same 
time before an arbitral tribunal. It picks up the problem of parallel proceedings discussed in 
detail above.
195
 Proposed is a priority rule in favour of the courts of a Member State where the 
arbitration takes place. Put into practise this could be a direct reference to the proposed Art. 
27 A in the Heidelberg Report or it could also mean that these courts might have exclusive 
jurisdiction when it comes to decide on the existence, validity and scope of the arbitration 
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agreement. In the first case, this could be problematically for some jurisdictions which do not 
have a procedure for declaratory relief.
196
 A further suggestion, which cannot be found in the 
Heidelberg Report is that this rule for jurisdiction could be combined with a strengthened 
cooperation between the courts seized, including time limits for the party contesting the 
validity of the agreement.  
 
4) Uniform conflict rule concerning the validity of an arbitration agreement 
The idea of a uniform conflict rule concerning the validity of arbitration agreements is also 
not mentioned in the Heidelberg Report. The Green Paper in contrast proposes such a rule, 
without offering a concrete suggestion though. It only says that the law of the state of the 
place of arbitration could serve in this regard as a connection point. The rule shall avoid the 
scenario where an agreement is considered valid in one country and void in another and 




5) Refusal of enforcement of a judgment irreconcilable with the arbitral award 
The Green Paper seeks to provide a solution for the unsatisfying present situation which 
tolerates recognition and enforcement of a judgment that is irreconcilable with an arbitral 
award.
198
 With the proposal of a rule that would allow the refusal of the enforcement of such 
judgments the Green Paper goes beyond the suggestions made in the Heidelberg Report. An 
alternative or even an additional rule could be „to grant the Member State where an arbitral 
award was given exclusive competence to certify the enforceability of the award as well as 
its´ procedural fairness, after which the award would freely circulate in the Community‟.
199
 
Alternatively advantage could be taken of Art. VII NYC to further facilitate at EU level the 
recognition of arbitral awards by adopting a uniform recognition rule. 
 
 
III) European Commission´s Proposal 
The European Commission published just recently, on the 14
th
 of December 2010, its concrete 
Proposal for the reform of the Brussels I Regulation. This Proposal was eagerly awaited and 
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will surely trigger animated debate again.
200
 In order to find an optimal solution, the European 
Commission took into account the proposals made in the Report and the Green Paper and the 
resulting extensive responses from the Member States, institutions, experts and the interested 
public.
201
 The results of several studies on the different aspects of the revision, in particular 
the Heidelberg Report and a 2006 study on residual jurisdiction
202
, and the opinions 
proclaimed in expert conferences on the reform were taken into consideration as well.
203
 At 
the end the European Commission analysed the costs and benefits of the main aspects of the 





Next to many other changes, inter alia the remarkable abolition of the „exequatur‟
205
, the 
Proposal also made significant modifications for those cases which are related to arbitration. 
The European Commission states in its explanatory memorandum that it sees a need for the 
improvement of the interface between arbitration and litigation.
206
 It recognises the 
controversial reactions with regard to the extension of the Brussels I Regulation to arbitration 
but views it as a necessity to give weight to the parties´ choices to arbitrate and acknowledges 
that this choice may be undermined by challenging the arbitration agreement before a court. 
The risk of parallel proceedings and irreconcilable resolutions of the dispute is costly and time 





1) Maintenance of the arbitration exclusion 
The highly disputed proposal of the deletion of the arbitration exclusion was not 
implemented. The abolition was a very radical and hence the most controversial point in the 
discussion about changes of the Brussels I Regulation with regard to the interface between the 
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 Art. 1 (2) (d) still says that the „Regulation shall not apply to 
arbitration‟, however, with the addition „save as provided for in Articles 29, paragraph 4 and 
33, paragraph 3’. A new recital shall underline the general inapplicability of the Regulation 
with regard to arbitration. No. (11) of the proposed new recital provides a clear statement by 
saying: „This Regulation does not apply to arbitration, save in the limited case provided for 
therein. In particular, it does not apply to the form, existence, validity or effects of arbitration 
agreements, the powers of the arbitrators, the procedure before arbitral tribunals, and the 
validity, annulment, and recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.‟ However, the 
amendment must nevertheless be described as a partial deletion of the exclusion of arbitration.  
 
2) Lis pendens rule taking arbitration into account 
The lis pendens rules, now regulated in section 10 of the Brussels I Regulation, are 
extensively amended in the Proposal. Especially the former Art. 27, now Art. 29, is 
considerably extended. The new subsection 4 contains a specific rule on the relation between 
arbitration and court proceedings, which deals directly with the problem that become apparent 
due to the West Tanker decision. The proposed Art. 29 (4) states:  
„Where the agreed or designated seat of an arbitration is in a Member State, the courts of 
another Member State whose jurisdiction is contested on the basis of an arbitration 
agreement shall stay proceedings once the courts of the Member State where the seat of the 
arbitration is located or the arbitral tribunal have been seised of proceedings to determine, as 
their main object or as an incidental question, the existence, validity or effects of that 
arbitration agreement. 
 
This paragraph does not prevent the court whose jurisdiction is contested from declining 
jurisdiction in the situation referred to above if its national law so prescribes. 
 
Where the existence, validity or effects of the arbitration agreement are established, the court 
seised shall decline jurisdiction.’ 
 
Therefore, it strengthens the parties‟ choice to settle their dispute by arbitration by obliging a 
court seised of a dispute to stay proceedings if its jurisdiction is contested on the basis of an 
arbitration agreement. It gives priority to the courts of the Member State of the seat of 
arbitration where court proceedings relating to the arbitration agreement have been 
commenced and to the arbitral tribunal that has been seised of the case. This is a significant 
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difference to the proposal made in the Heidelberg Report which only gives preference to the 
courts of the place of arbitration. Furthermore it is expressively stated that both, proceedings 
which determine the existence, validity or effects of the arbitration agreements as their main 
and also as an incidental question are included, which leads to a very broad application of this 
rule. The paragraph shall according to the last sentence in Art. 29 (4) not apply in disputes 
concerning matters referred to in section 3, 4 and 5 of chapter II, namely matters relating to 
insurance, consumer contracts and individual contracts of employment. 
 
The aim and purpose of the suggested amendments is explicitly quoted in a new No. (20) of 
the recital – the prevention of parallel proceedings and the avoidance of abusive litigation. 
Moreover it is defined what one has to understand by the reference made in Art. 29 (4) to the 
„seat of the arbitration‟. No. (20) states: „The effectiveness of arbitration agreements should 
also be improved in order to give full effect to the will of the parties. This should be the case, 
in particular, where the agreed or designated seat of an arbitration is in a Member State. This 
Regulation should therefore contain special rules aimed at avoiding parallel proceedings and 
abusive litigation tactics in those circumstances. The seat of the arbitration should refer to 
the seat selected by the parties or the seat designated by an arbitral tribunal, by an arbitral 
institution or by any other authority directly or indirectly chosen by the parties.‟ Compared to 
the proposed recital in the Heidelberg Report it sticks out that no uniform criteria for 
determining the place of arbitration are set out for the case that the seat was not designated. 
 
The current Art. 30 which stipulates the times at which a court for the purpose of the section 
dealing with lis pendens is deemed to be seised, is modified as well and could in the future be 
found under Art. 33. Due to the fact that arbitration is included in the lis pendens rules, the 
time at which an arbitral tribunal should be seen as being seised has to be specified too. 
According to Art. 33(3) of the proposals, „an arbitral tribunal is deemed to be seised when a 
party has nominated an arbitrator or when a party has requested the support of an institution, 
authority or a court for the tribunal's constitution. 
 
To what extend the expressed criticism in reaction to the Green Paper was taken into account 
or disregarded and what problems could be resolved should the Proposal be adopted or 















E) Critical evaluation 
 
Three official proposals were made. Three different statements on how to amend the Brussels 
I Regulation with regard to its interface with arbitration have been offered. All of them 
launched each time a vivid and inspiring debate which led to even more different suggestions 
for improvement. But how can the perfect solution be found? 
 
Central question of all potential proposals is whether or not to delete the arbitration exclusion 
embedded in Art. 1 (2) (d). A deletion would have far-reaching consequences as it were to 
bring all judgments on the validity of the arbitration clause and also judgments rendered in 
support of arbitration under the regime of the Brussels I Regulation. Many institutions 
opposed a deletion of the arbitration exception or any changes of the Brussels I Regulation in 
that regard only with reference to the good functioning of the New York Convention but 
without concrete statements to the specific proposals.
209
 Others are with similar few 
arguments at least „not opposed‟ to the proposed amendments.
210
 However, many other voices 
from academia and practice have been intensively involved with the topic and presented many 
arguments in favour and against certain proposals. 
 
As one can see the proposals in the Green Paper and those submitted by the European 
Commission in its recent Proposal differ quite significantly. This can surely be attributed to 
the many responses on the Green Paper.
211
 Although the comments made on question No. 7 
vary broadly, main tendencies in certain areas can be detected. 
 
Agreement seems to exist on one point: arbitration has become a matter of great importance to 
international commerce. Therefore a swift arbitration process is desirable based on clear and 
concise rules and a clear and non-conflictual enforcement system internationally. However, it 
is important to underline that the objective of any amendments to the Brussels I Regulation is 
not to regulate arbitration but to prevent parallel proceedings and to ensure a close 
coordination of court and arbitration proceedings.
212
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In the discussion two main points have emerged that should be taken into account whilst 
thinking of any changes. The first is the well functioning of the current form of the Brussels I 
Regulation and the New York Convention.
213
 The second is the great importance of 
arbitration and the danger of ill-considered changes. Any changes should be made in 
consideration of its key elements: party autonomy and the expressed wish to solve the dispute 
outside of the court.
214
 With regard to these points all envisaged changes have to be evaluated 
carefully and their effectiveness has to be balanced with the new difficulties they might cause 
in practise. 
 
Before engaging with the question whether to delete or to keep the arbitration exclusion this 
paper will have a look at the individual provisions that were proposed. These provisions are 
suggested either to solve the current problems without opening the scope of the Regulation or 
as necessary additional rules in case of a deletion of the arbitration exception. This is due to 
the fact that arbitration differs from its basic idea from certain criteria applicable to litigation 
and that the rules stipulated in the Brussels I Regulation are not automatically appropriate for 
arbitration. Deleting Art, 1 (2) (d) would necessarily call for further regulation. 
 
 
I) Exclusive jurisdiction for ancillary supportive proceedings 
The Green Paper and the Heidelberg Report suggested contrary to the Proposal an exclusive 
jurisdiction rule for „ancillary proceedings concerned with the support of arbitration‟.
215
 The 
idea behind the suggested Art. 22 (6) which gives courts of the place of arbitration this 
exclusive jurisdiction was to exclude competition between different state courts in relation to 
the same arbitration proceedings.
216
 Indeed, such a rule could avoid costly and time intensive 
jurisdiction problems
217
 and the interference by courts where another is already engaged with 
the subject.
218
 The provision was described as having the advantage of being clear and 
unambiguous.
219
 Moreover, assigning exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of the place of 
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arbitration seems reasonable since the place of arbitration is an essential element of nearly all 




1) Problematic aspects 
Nevertheless, the Proposal did well not to adopt the proposed Art. 22 (6). As clear and 
unambiguous as it may seem at first glance, it raises a lot of new questions after having had a 
closer look.  
 
For a start it should be clarified that a one-size-fits-all approach for proceedings in support of 
arbitration, which include an enormous variety of different measures, is not possible. Whereas 
allocating jurisdiction to the country of the seat of arbitration is - at least generally - in limited 
cases such as the appointment of arbitrators appropriate, it is equally inappropriate in other 




a) Taking of evidence  
State court support in the latter field should be granted in the country where the evidence is 
located and where the respective measure is to be enforced.
222
 This is most often in the 
countries where the parties are domiciled. However, in international arbitration this place is 
generally not the place of the seat of arbitration due to the fact that parties to arbitration tend 
to choose a neutral place of a third country.
223
 As a consequence, the proposed exclusive 
jurisdiction would prevent courts from the parties‟ home countries to assist the tribunal in the 
taking of evidence. In this regard the provision would not bring any improvement but lead to a 
cumbersome procedure which would make it necessary to apply to the court of the seat of 
arbitration to issue an official request for judicial cross-border assistance.
224
 This alone could 
in turn already lead to a loss of attractiveness of EU countries as a seat of arbitration.  
 
There are two possibilities to amend the provision in order to avoid this time and money 
consuming process. The first is simply to exclude evidentiary measures entirely from such 
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 With that solution this field would still be dealt with by national 
arbitration laws. The second option is an additional special regulation for supportive measures 
in the field of taking evidence and other judicial acts
226
 that assigns jurisdiction to the courts 
of the country where these measures are required.
227
 Such a rule could foster the interaction 
between arbitral tribunals and courts in other countries on a Community level. Though, it is 
questionable whether the Brussels I Regulation is the right instrument to embed such a rule. 
As the German §§ 1025, 1050 II ZPO
228
 show, such regulations already exist at the level of 
national arbitration laws. The German provisions were very progressive and unique at the 
beginning.
229
 Yet, the UNCITRAL Model Law, after being amended in 2006, now also 
contains a provision providing for assistance rendered by courts of a country different to that 
where the arbitration takes place.
230
 This shows a development towards awareness of the 
efficiency of such a rule. It is meant as an incentive to the national arbitration laws to 
implement the possibility of assisting an arbitral tribunal although being located in another 
country.
231
 Such a far-reaching provision that interferes with the respective national laws, 
which partly do not provide for such regulation yet, should not be dealt with on a Community 
level. If at all, one could think about implementing a special jurisdiction rule for the taking of 
evidence in the European Evidence Regulation.
232
 Yet, this Regulation exists in order to 
facilitate judicial cooperation and does not regulate jurisdictions. Its aim is it to smooth the 
process of taking evidence in another Member State by enabling courts to communicate 
directly without recourse to diplomatic channels.
233
 The Regulation therefore only addresses 
the interaction of courts and is silent about possible communications between courts and 
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arbitral tribunals in different Member States. In what way changes to this Regulation might 
nevertheless be reasonable requires a detailed engagement with the Evidence Regulation 
which shall not be subject to this paper. 
 
However, with regard to the Brussels I Regulation, the exclusion of evidentiary measures and 
other judicial acts is in any case preferable. Excluding these measures would as well as 
including them in a special rule require a precise and unambiguous definition of what 
measures are covered from the exclusion. Especially the exclusion of „other judicial acts‟ 
would most probably lead to different interpretations on an international level.  
 
b) Establishment of the arbitral tribunal 
In the case of appointing arbitrators respectively the establishment of the arbitral tribunal, the 
suggested provision looks more appropriate since it is useful if the court with the closest 
connection, namely the court of the place of arbitration, has jurisdiction. But again this should 
remain within the competence of the national legislators which largely fulfilled their 
obligation in this field already. Since most of national arbitration laws in the EU provide for 




Furthermore there were cases where due to exceptional circumstances courts of a foreign 
Member State were asked to assist in the establishment of foreign arbitral tribunals.
235
 In such 
constellations an exclusive jurisdiction rule would prevent those courts from providing 
assistance even if the respective national laws would allow doing so. Following from that an 
exclusive jurisdiction rule that is not even needed since most of the national laws provide for 
court assistance for arbitral proceedings would also take away the possibility to react flexibly 
in exceptional situations.  
 
c) Wording „ancillary‟ 
Moreover the rule in the proposed wording is predetermined to lead to problems. By using the 
world „ancillary‟ the distinction to „parallel‟ proceedings made in van Uden would be picked 
up again. Following from that, the latter would not be covered by the new exclusive 
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jurisdiction. However, this would result in the known demarcation problems
236
 already 
becoming apparent in the different responses to the Green Paper. While some criticise that the 
proposed exclusive jurisdiction is for the same reasons as in the matter of the taking of 
evidence inappropriate in cases of interim relief,
237
 others do not even see Art. 22 (6) 
applicable.
238
 The latter view should be given preference since it is based on the gained 
insights from the judgments in Marc Rich and van Uden. According to these decisions interim 
measures can be seen as ancillary only if the subject matter of the provisional measure is not 
concerned with the contractual obligation but with the arbitration proceedings itself.
239
 Hence, 
interim injunctions cannot be seen as „ancillary‟ supportive measures since they do not serve 
the arbitration as such but protect the substantive right of the cause of action. 
The different opinions show that the wording did already trigger misjudgments and surely 
would do so in the future as well. Hence, courts of Member States where interim relief is 
sought but which are not located at the place of arbitration as is commonly the case might 
decline jurisdiction with reference to Art. 22 (6) although the rule is not applicable. 
 
2) Résumé 
As one can see an exclusive jurisdiction rule would not solve half the problems it creates. 
Even if evidentiary measures are excluded from such a provision it would still lead to 
demarcation problems and not create the unambiguous legal situation that was strived for. 
Especially against the background tha  national laws regulate this situation satisfactorily a 
need for a change is unnecessary and should therefore be refrained from. 
 
 
II) Lis pendens rule 
The one big amendment made in the Proposal concerning arbitration is the introduction of a 
new Art. 29 (4). This provision obliges courts in a Member State „whose jurisdiction is 
contested on the basis of an arbitration agreement to stay proceedings once the courts of the 
Member State where the seat of arbitration is located or the arbitral tribunal have been seised 
of proceedings to determine, as their main object or as an incidental question, the existence, 
validity or effects of that arbitration agreement‟.  
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This rule is supposed to approach the problem of parallel proceedings and the unsatisfying 
situation made clear by the West Tanker decision. In order to avoid the situation that one court 
decides on the merits, considering the objection of an arbitration agreement as unfounded, 
while an arbitral tribunal is of the opposite opinion and continues proceedings as well, this 
rule determines who has priority to decide on the existence
240
 of the arbitration agreement. 
Such a priority rule was already suggested in the Heidelberg Report and the Green Paper, 
however, in a different version. It is called the „anti-torpedo torpedo‟
241
 alluding to the 
abusive tactics by torpedoing proceedings
242
 the provision is meant to eliminate. 
 
1) Priority to the courts of the seat of arbitration and to the arbitral tribunal 
The recent Proposal differs from that made in the Green Paper
243
 by demanding a stay of 
proceedings not only in favour of the court of the seat of arbitration but also of the arbitral 
tribunal. In this regard the Proposal makes a significant and absolutely necessary change as a 
means of reacting to the broadly voiced critique.
244
 As mentioned above all changes made in 
this field of the Brussels I Regulation must take the key elements underpinning arbitration 
into account, one of which is party autonomy and the free choice based thereon to have the 
dispute settled outside the courts. The well-known principle in international arbitration of 
competence-competence, which states that the arbitral tribunal has the power to decide on its 
own jurisdiction, takes this aim into account.
245
 However, giving only the courts of the seat of 
arbitration priority to determine the question of jurisdiction would undermine this principle 
since it ignores the role of the tribunal.
246
 A party having bargained for arbitration would have 
to go to a court in order to paralyse a suit brought before another court in breach of the 
arbitration agreement.
247
 Concerns have been expressed that the weakening of the 
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competence-competence principle could as a consequence make the EU-Member States less 
attractive as seats of arbitration.
248
   
Although the provision was apparently not intended to frustrate the respective national laws
249
 
the formulation chosen by the European Commission made an important change. It does not 
leave any space for misunderstandings anymore and gives the arbitral tribunal and the parties´ 
will the importance it ought to have. The second sentence of Art. 29 (4) explicitly responds to 
the doctrine of negative competence-competence, clarifying that the court whose jurisdiction 
is contested may decline jurisdiction if its national law so prescribes.
250
 Hence the current 
proposed rule takes the different national laws into consideration. Since not all national laws 
empower their courts to grant declaratory relief on the existence and validity of an arbitration 
agreement it is important to force another court in a different Member State to stay 




2) Arbitration as a main or incidental question 
Moreover, by explicitly formulating that courts have to stay proceedings once the court of the 
seat or the tribunal have been seised to determine the existence of the arbitration agreement 
„as their main object or as an incidental question‟ the new Art. 29 (4) also clarifies the 
unsatisfying situation resulting from the ECJ´s case law in Marc Rich, van Uden and West 
Tankers. Choosing this wording has as a consequence that the courts of the seat of arbitration 
have priority to decide on the existence of an arbitration agreement and clarifies that this is 
independent from the fact whether arbitration is the subject matter in this claim or not. As 
soon as the existence of an arbitration agreement is brought forward the jurisdiction rules of 
the Brussels I Regulation cannot be relied on. This is contrary to the current situation. If 
arbitration is the main object of the claim the Brussels I Regulation is not applicable due to 
Art. 1 (2) (d) with the result that national laws determine whether the court or the arbitral 
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 This point was also criticised by A Mourre, who therefore suggested already in 2009 to give priority to the 















tribunal shall decide on the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. However, 
where proceedings are brought on the merits of the dispute and the question of arbitration is 
only brought forward incidentally as an objection, the arbitration exclusion is not applicable 
and the decision on that objection also falls within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation.
252
 
Consequently under these circumstances the court competent under the Regulation may 
nevertheless decide on the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement.  
The intention to avoid this and to exclude arbitration comprehensively is underlined in the 
proposed recital (11) which explicitly points out that the Regulation and its rules of 
jurisdiction do not apply to the form, existence, validity or effects of arbitration agreements. 
This development is positive and reacts correctly to the expressed critique that these two types 
of judgments on the validity, depending on whether arbitration was the main or only an 
incidental issue, are treated differently at the moment.
253
 In order to avoid last doubts, the 
phrase ‘regardless whether raised as a main object or incidental question’ should be included 
in the recital too. It would read as follows then: „This Regulation does not apply to 
arbitration, save in the limited case provided for therein. In particular, it does not apply to 
the form, existence, validity or effects of arbitration agreements ‘regardless whether raised as 
a main object or incidental question’, the powers of the arbitrators, the procedure before 
arbitral tribunals, and the validity, annulment, and recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards.’ 
 
3) Remaining concerns 
However, giving the arbitral tribunal priority could on the other hand lead to practical 
problems. It was raised that the risk of unenforceable arbitral awards would be imminent if 
the tribunal were to decide on its jurisdiction.
254
 This is because of Art. V (1) (a) NYC, which 
provides for non-recognition if the court enforcing the award regards the arbitration 
agreement as non-existent, void or not covering the dispute in question. Hence, even though a 
tribunal may have found the arbitration agreement valid, a court might at the enforcement 
stage still decide differently since it is not bound by the tribunal´s decision. The 
argumentation is therefore that in the end it is always a state court which has the final say. In 
view of this fact it would be preferable to get a binding decision of a Member State court right 
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at the beginning in order to avoid a time and money consuming arbitration of which the result 




This argument is not convincing though. First, the primary aim and purpose of the rule is to 
address the problem of parallel proceedings, usually caused by a party that wants to delay 
proceedings on purpose. This is achieved through going to a court in a country where such 
proceedings normally take very long. However, at an enforcement stage the possibility of 
choosing a slow court does not exist anymore since the country of enforcement is determined 
by the winning party due to the presence of the assets. Besides, in such delaying processes the 
grounds for refusing the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement are usually spurious 
and therefore not helpful in the enforcing procedure. Here the party, against whom 
enforcement is invoked, has to prove the invalidity and threadbare grounds cannot delay the 
process for long. Summarising this means, the initial intention of delaying proceedings at the 
beginning would be deprived by the proposed Art. 29 (4) due to the fact that every court other 
than that of the seat of arbitration had to stay proceedings if its jurisdiction was contested. The 
possibility that a party contest the validity of the arbitration agreement for abusive tactic 
reasons when the award is going to be enforced is very unlikely to happen. 
 
In case the objections against the validity of the arbitration agreement are indeed earnest, they 
would already have been raised and properly recognised during the arbitration. Only if the 
party contests the validity at the enforcement stage again although the tribunal affirmed the 
existence of a valid arbitration agreement and presumed that the court would in fact decide 
differently and deny the existence if a valid agreement, time and money for the arbitration 
was admittedly in vain. However, when weighing this unlikely situation against the advantage 
of the rule, namely that it recognises the parties‟ original will to exclude court interference, 
the latter definitively prevails. Moreover, the rule leaves a certain scope. The party who 
contests the jurisdiction of another court on the basis of an arbitration agreement has the 
choice either to go to the tribunal or to the court of the seat of arbitration in order to get a 
decision on the existence of an arbitration agreement. If this party fears that the other party 
will if necessary contest the validity of the arbitration agreement at the enforcement stage 
again, it has according to Art. 29 (4) the possibility to get a binding decision from the court of 
the seat of arbitration right at the beginning.  
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Nevertheless the rule would not preclude any abuse – this time commenced by the defendant. 
He could at first participate in the proceedings the other party has commenced at a court 
which would have jurisdiction if there was no arbitration agreement. Only after some time has 
passed the defendant could decide to go to the court of the seat or to the arbitral tribunal 
raising the objection of the existence of an arbitration agreement. The court first seised had to 
stay proceedings and the process could also be delayed in this way. This theoretical potential 
for highly unlikely abuse must be accepted though with regard to the fact that such cases do 





The problem of parallel proceedings is indisputably apparent and a solution has to be found to 
stop abusive delaying tactics. The suggested Art. 29 (4) seems to address this problem in a 
much appreciated manner. Most of the expressed doubts in reaction to the proposal in the 
Green Paper could be removed. The rule is formulated in a way that serves all different types 
of national arbitration laws.
257
 Moreover the party invoking the validity of the arbitration 
agreement while the other party already commenced court proceedings on the merits of the 
dispute can decide on its own if he wants to have the question decided by the court of the seat 
of arbitration or by the tribunal itself. 
  
A further argument in favour of implementing such a rule in the Brussels I Regulation is that 
it is impossible to handle this situation on a national level. Member States cannot by 
themselves ensure that arbitration proceedings in their country are properly coordinated with 
court proceedings going on in another Member State because the effect of national legislation 




If one is balancing the possible problems that might occur with the problems that are going to 
be solved by such a rule, the latter point definitely predominates. Hence, the rule should be 
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III) Uniform criteria for determining the seat of arbitration 
The Green Paper proposed criteria for determining the seat of arbitration based on the 
suggested new recital in the Heidelberg Report for the purpose of the envisioned exclusive 
jurisdiction rule and the priority rule. Although an exclusive jurisdiction for supportive 
measures is not existent in the Proposal and also not recommended in this paper
259
 such 
criteria should still be established for the purpose of Art. 29 (4). 
 
1) Who should designate the place of the seat? 
Whereas the Green Paper and the Heidelberg Report only take the parties´ agreement or the 
arbitral tribunal´s determination into account when it comes to the identification of the place 
of arbitration
260
, the Proposal added that the seat might also be designated „by an arbitral 
institution or any other authority directly or indirectly chosen by the parties‟.
261
 This 
amendment was important since it leaves less or even no space for the necessity of a default 
rule. Even if the place of arbitration is not determined by the parties yet they have opted for an 
arbitral institution that provides for rules allocating the seat of jurisdiction in the absence of an 
explicit choice.
262
 Practice has shown that the use of arbitral institutions is in fact very 
common, especially because these institutions provide for rules in various situations the 
parties might not have thought of in the beginning. Due to the resulting applicability of 
national arbitration laws the seat of arbitration is always a legal and hence an important choice 
as well, which should be recognised to he widest possible extent – even if it is just an indirect 
one through an arbitral institution. Allowing to determine the seat moreover by „any other 
authority directly or indirectly chosen by the parties‟ seems to have no real practical meaning 
since it is hard to imagine what kind of authority it should be to which parties transfer their 
choice if not an arbitral institution. On the other hand this provision does no harm and might 
be useful for some seldom constellations.   
 
The suggestion which assigned the power of the seat´s determination in second instance to the 
court of the Capital of the designated Member State Deleted was already in the Green Paper. 
Apart from the fact that this rule would be completely superfluous it is not even clear what is 
actually meant with the Capital of the „designated‟ Member State.  
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2) Default rule 
Ceased from the earlier proposals for modification is also the default rule, namely the rule 
allocating the seat of arbitration in the absence of a direct or indirect choice. Originally it was 
suggested to consider the court as competent „which would have general jurisdiction over the 
dispute under the Regulation if there was no arbitration agreement‟
263
 or even the „courts of 
the Member States which would have jurisdiction‟
264
. Having a default rule seems principally 
useful. For this reason it should be scrutinised whether it is reasonable to adopt neither the 
proposed provisions nor an alternative one as is currently the case in the Proposal. 
 
Aim and purpose of the default rule is to find a solution for determining the seat of arbitration 
in absence of a choice which is compatible with the general intention of the parties involved. 
Parties to international arbitration usually choose the seat of arbitration due its neutrality, the 
quality of the national arbitration law and the court´s support with regard to arbitration.
265
 A 
rule referring to the jurisdiction rules of the Brussels I Regulation in order to allocate the seat 
of arbitration would mean that one party would most probably have to litigate in its 
counterparty´s home courts. However, this is precisely what the parties to arbitration want to 
avoid – the loss of neutrality of having their dispute settled in a forum independent from all 
parties´ legal orders.
266
 The jurisdiction rules of the Brussels I Regulation do fit the purpose of 
litigation but not that of arbitration which is inter alia specifically chosen because of the 
independence of the rigid litigation system and its neutrality. Hence, a rule with reference to a 





Furthermore the formulation chosen by the Green Paper, i.e. to connect to the „courts of the 
Member State which would have jurisdiction‟ and not only to the one court with general 
jurisdiction, induces additional problems. The Brussels I Regulation sometimes grants 
jurisdiction to a number of Member States. For instance the courts at the place where the 
defendant is domiciled could have jurisdiction according to Art. 2 Brussels I Regulation at the 
same time as those at the place of performance of the obligation, Art. 5 (1) (a) Brussels I 
Regulation. Which rule shall be applicable then? According to the Brussels I Regulation this 
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decision depends on the claimant. Accordingly, this would in practice allow the plaintiff on its 
own instance to place the seat of arbitration in a state most preferential to him.
268
 Such a 




If a default rule is implemented, such a provision must be predictable and unequivocal and 
should make reference to a neutral connection point although the practical implementation, 
respectively the determination of the basis for such a connection point seems difficult. Maybe 
precisely because of this problem it might be preferable to entirely omit such a default rule. 
This should to a large extend be conditional to the frequency of situations in which the need 
for a default rule appears. It is to say that the implementation of a new provision is only 
advisable if its benefit outweigh the problems it involves. 
 
The rule would have been mainly needed for an exclusive jurisdiction for supportive 
measures. Especially at the stage where the support of national courts is needed in arbitration, 
the seat of arbitration has often not been determined by the parties yet.
270
 But even in such a 
situation the possibility that no other authority is entitled to determine the seat might only 
occur in the rare situation of ad hoc arbitration without adopted rules, such as the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, which address the issue of the place of arbitration.  
However, following the recent Proposal and the suggestion in this paper a default rule would 
only apply to the new lis pendens rule. By the time proceedings have already started it is even 
harder to imagine that the seat of arbitration had not been determined either directly or 
indirectly. For the vanishing possibility that this might nevertheless occur whatsoever the lis 
pendens rule is simply not applicable due to the fact that there is no „agreed or designated seat 
of arbitration‟.
271
 This solution is acceptable and certainly better than providing for a rule 
incompatible with the idea of arbitration. Further to that it is for the parties to avoid this 
scenario by simply defining the seat of arbitration in time and hence creating a certain degree 
of legal certainty. It cannot be the legislator´s duty to have the ideal solution for every 
situation the parties themselves could have easily avoided. 
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IV) Determination of „valid arbitration agreement‟ 
The Green Paper proposes a uniform rule specifying the determination of the validity of an 
arbitration agreement without further explaining how such a rule could look like in detail. It 
only suggests the law of the state of the place of arbitration as a possible connecting point. 
Again, such a provision cannot be found in the current Proposal. 
 
The idea behind such a rule is simple. In order to avoid inconsistent decisions amongst the 
Member States the requirements for a valid arbitration agreement shall be regulated or at least 
the law under which the question has to be decided shall be determined uniformly. Among the 
responses to the Green Paper the suggestion definitely found supporters.
272
 Indeed, a uniform 





Creating a rule that stipulates requirements for the validity of an arbitration agreement, e.g. 
whether the agreement has to be in writing, whether fax and email are sufficient and so on,
274
 
completely disregards that the objective of the reform is not to regulate arbitration but to 
prevent parallel proceedings and to ensure a close coordination of court and arbitration 
proceedings.
275
 One should by all means refrain from regulating questions in the Brussels I 
Regulation which are the inherent task of arbitration laws themselves.  
 
A uniform rule determining the law which shall be applicable in deciding about the validity of 
the arbitration agreement does not fit in the Brussels I Regulation either since the latter is 
concerned with questions of jurisdiction and not with the determination of the applicable law. 
Following from that a uniform conflict rule would unbalance the present system.
276
   
 
Regard must also be had to the provisions of the NCY. Art. II (3) NYC sets certain criteria for 
the validity of an arbitration agreement and so does Art. V (1) (a) which lists as a ground for 
refusal of enforcement the invalidity of the arbitration agreement. This has to be examined 
according to the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing such indication, under 
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the law of the country were the award was made. In the end it is the NYC anyway that sets the 
standards for determining the validity of an arbitration agreement. A rule referring only to the 
law of the place of arbitration would, however, clash with Art. V (1) (a) NYC which refers to 
the law the parties have chosen in the first place.
277
 Apart from all that not even a uniform 
conflict rule would be able to protect from different interpretations in the concrete cases. 
 
Putting all these explanations aside for a moment, the decisive argument for not implementing 
such a rule is simply because it is not needed anymore if Art. 29 (4) is put into operation. The 
constellation that a court decides about the validity of an arbitration agreement while at the 
same time another court or the tribunal judges about the same question and reaches a different 
outcome would no longer occur. It is the court of the seat or the tribunal itself that has 
exclusive power to decide this question if the defendant does not agree with a court of another 
Member State that has been seised. Instead of reaching a potentially different result the latter 
court has to stay its proceedings which prevent inconsistent outcomes right away. 
 
However, besides this admittedly strong argument, the concerns mentioned above show by 
themselves that the implementation of a conflict rule into the Brussels I Regulation would 
certainly not be a suitable way to cope with the current problems. 
 
 
V) How to avoid the enforcement of judgments in disregard of arbitration? 
At the current level of European law the possibility of parallel court and arbitral proceedings 
can result in the enforcement of a judgment in breach of an arbitration agreement.
278
 This 
unpleasant situation was also an issue in the discussion for amendments of the Brussels I 
Regulation. A rule addressing that problem directly cannot be found in the Proposal. The 
Green Paper in contrast proposes to establish a provision that allows for refusal of such 
judgments. For this purpose it incites to grant the courts of the Member State where the award 
was rendered exclusive competence to certify the enforceability of the award. After having 
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1) Exclusive competence to certify enforceability of arbitral awards 
However, at least that part of the proposal which suggests an exclusive competence for 
attesting the enforceability of an award generated a lot of opposition.
280
 Recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards is the subject-matter of the New York Convention and it was 
continually emphasised that amendments to the Brussels I Regulation shall not conflict with 
this successful instrument.
281
 It is one of its outstanding characteristics that the so called 
„double exequatur‟ in arbitration was abolished which resulted in the practical fact that no 
leave for enforcement in the country of origin was needed anymore.
282
 The proposed rule is 
criticised as a reintroduction of the „double exequatur‟.
283
 This statement is not entirely 
correct since the „double exequatur‟ requires also recognition from the courts of the country 
where the award shall be enforced, which would not be the case according to the Green 
Paper´s proposal. Nevertheless such a rule would be contrary to those of the New York 
Convention, i.e. Art. III NYC. According to the New York Convention all Contracting States 
shall recognise arbitral awards as binding and it is the right of the courts of the place of 
enforcement to refuse recognition under the enumerated grounds of Art. V NYC. Following 
the proposal of an exclusive competence, however, the courts of a Member State other than 
that of the seat would be prohibited from enforcing an award without prior certification. This 
is also dubious from the perspective that the Member States have different legal principles on 
enforcement of awards. Whilst on the one hand the New York Convention provides a certain 
degree of conformity it refrains to eliminate all these differences on the other hand. However, 
the proposal would force a court to enforce an award even if it is contrary to the public policy 
of that country. In order to be in line with the New York Convention, the power to decide 
about possible grounds of refusal must remain with the courts of the Member States where the 
award is to be enforced. However, this would indeed mean a reintroduction of the „double 
exequatur‟ by introducing an extra layer of national court involvement, which is entirely 
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2) Judgment in disregard of arbitration as an additional ground for refusal 
Yet, even without such a procedure the proposal of a refusal of the enforcement of a judgment 
which is irreconcilable with an arbitral award raises problems, too.
285
 Suggested was an 
additional ground for refusal in Art. 35 Brussels I Regulation.
286
 A certain degree of 
attractiveness is certainly inherent in this suggestion. However, it was criticised that the 
solidary community among the Member States cannot in any event be given up in favour of 
an arbitral award. The existence of a judgment irreconcilable with an arbitral award shows 
that the jurisdiction of the respective court was not or not successfully challenged. In the latter 
case the court´s decision should be recognised especially in terms of mutual trust.
287
 This 
approach is somehow comprehensible. After all, besides the importance of arbitration the 
relevance of state court proceedings should not be forgotten. However, this approach does not 
solve the problem of two parties showing up with two different decisions that they want to 
have enforced. 
Notwithstanding this, an amendment of Art. 35 would disregard the other changes that are 
sought to be achieved by the improvement of the Brussels I Regulation beyond the single 
point of the interface with arbitration. One big amendment strived for in the course on the 
review of the Brussels I Regulation is the abolition of exequatur.
288
 Following that, an 
enforceability declaration from the enforcing court would not be needed anymore and only a 
very limited number of safeguards for the defendant shall remain available.
289
 Suggesting a 
new ground for refusal is in total contrast to that aimed change. If the abolition of exequatur is 
adopted, there would be no stage anymore at which this ground could be considered. 
 
Yet, an extension of Art. 35 does not even seem necessary because here too the suggested Art. 
29 (4) proves to be advantageous. If a court of a Member State other than that of the seat is 
obliged to stay proceedings till the arbitral tribunal or the court of the seat decided that the 
arbitration agreement is void or non-existent, the situation in which a judgment in non-
recognition of an arbitration agreement or award is rendered can no longer occur. The 
potential that a court is seised once the arbitration has started already and that in this way 
clashing decisions might be produced is prevented by the third sentence of Art. 29 (4). It says 
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that a court shall decline jurisdiction where the existence, validity or effects of the arbitration 
agreement are established. Thus, a decision cannot be rendered in this case either. 
 
However, it was suggested to underpin at least the duty under Art. 29 (4) by an additional 
ground for refusal. According to that enforcement of a decision by the court first seised 
disregarding the mandatory stay should be refused.
290
 This proposal would also contradict the 
intention to abolish exequatur though. Moreover, mutual trust is a basic principle of the 
Brussels I Regulation.
291
 Courts of one Member State have to trust that courts of other 
Member States apply the Regulation correctly. A safeguard in form of a control of the 
Regulation´s right application would replace this trust by a system which nullifies this 
principle and is therefore to be rejected emphatically.    
 
 
VI) The arbitration exception – keep it or delete it? 
After having scrutinised all these different proposals one shall be referred back to the central 
question whether to retain or delete the arbitration exclusion. The elucidations have shown 
that every change that introduces arbitration into the system of the Brussels I Regulation is 
likely to cause as many new problems as it tries to solve.  
  
1) Deletion 
For this reason, one should refrain from the idea of a complete deletion of Art. 1 (2) (d), 
which seems to reflect the majority opinion too.
292
 The deletion of the arbitration exclusion 
would be a radical proposal with far-reaching and not in all and every respect foreseeable 
consequences.
293
 Because of that and due to the good functioning of the NYC, with which a 
new Brussels I Regulation without the arbitration exclusion is likely to conflict, should every 
amendment only be done after careful evaluation and greatest possible restraint.
294
 
Consequently, every intervention should be omitted as long as it does not involve significant 
improvements. Possible disadvantages accompanying any amendments shall only be excepted 
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if they outweigh the existing difficulties. However, this is not the case here. Since the first 
consultation on this topic the overwhelming majority of the respondents is of the opinion that 
a far-reaching change in the law cannot be justified due to the very manageable number of 
occasions in which the interfaces between arbitration and the Brussels I Regulation have led 
to serious difficulties.
295
 The deletion of the exclusion is therefore refused in fear that the 
extension of the Brussels I Regulation would give rise to even more difficulties.
296
 This fear is 
not unjustified. The suggestion to delete the arbitration exception altogether would bring all 
arbitration-related court proceedings within the scope of the Regulation. As a consequence all 
rules of jurisdiction would apply to these proceedings. For cases related to the wholly 
different system of arbitration this is not necessarily suitable though
297
 and results in turn in a 
need for additional rules in order to correct this situation. Yet, the establishment of new rules 




In view of the fact that the Heidelberg Report already acknowledges that the present regime 
has generally proven satisfactory for parties and practitioners and with regard to the responses 




The other possibility is to keep the arbitration exclusion. Yet, this paper and the vivid debate 
on this topic have shown that the retention of the current legal situation is not satisfactory 
either. However, sticking on th  arbitration exclusion does not automatically have to lead to a 
complete adherence to the present rules. It is also possible to keep arbitration in general 
outside the Brussels I Regulation but to address certain problems positively by adding specific 
rules. This is what the proposal did. It retained the arbitration exclusion with only a few 
exceptions or - in order to describe it differently - it partial deleted the exclusion. 
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In detail, arbitration is still excluded from the scope of the Brussels I Regulation „save as 
provided for in Articles 29, paragraph 4 and 33, paragraph 3.’
299
 The suggested new recital 
No (11) emphasises the exclusion by saying that the regulation, save in the limited case 
therein, does not apply „to the form, existence, validity or effects of arbitration agreements, 
the powers of the arbitrators, the procedure before arbitral tribunals and the validity, 
annulment and recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards‟. With regard to the proposed 
Art. 29 (4) 1. sentence it can be assumed that the exclusion shall apply regardless whether a 
court hearing deals with these questions as a main or incidental object.
300
 A corresponding 




The consequence of retaining the arbitration exclusion is that judgments deciding on the 
existence or validity of an arbitration agreement do principally not fall within the scope of the 
Brussels I Regulation and are not automatically recognised in the EU. With regard to a 
judgment establishing the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement this is not desirable 
though, since it opens the floodgate for parallel proceedings and inconceivable decisions.
302
 
This is exactly why Art. 29 (4) stipulates that „[w]here the existence, validity or effects of the 
arbitration agreement are established, the court seised shall decline jurisdiction.’ This 
provision in connection with the obligation of a mandatory stay of proceedings of a court in a 
Member State other than the one of the seat, demanded for in the 1. sentence, avoids the 
occurrence of parallel proceedings. Priority is given to the arbitral tribunal or the court of the 
seat of the arbitration to decide on the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. As 
soon as this is established every other court is prohibited from deciding in the same case 
again. 
 
However, a judgment invalidating an arbitration agreement would not automatically be 
recognised by the other Member States due to the comprehensive exclusion of arbitration and 
a lack of a special rule. Both parties could still try to establish the validity in front of another 
court again if the court of the seat declines the existence of an arbitration agreement. Yet, this 
case is not likely to happen. The party invoking the arbitration agreement would rather go 
directly to the tribunal, in which case all other courts still had to stay proceedings according to 
Art. 29 (4). This is the forum the party actually opted for and a positive decision is more 
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likely to be achieved than from a foreign court without any connection to the arbitration. If the 
tribunal also denies the validity of the agreement, an arbitration will definitely not take place. 
A party would not gain any advantage by trying to get a different decision from another court 
again since this is not binding on the tribunal and could therefore not reverse its decision. 
 
Moreover, the exclusion of decisions invalidating an arbitration agreement from an automatic 
recognition avoids a clash with the NYC. Would such a decision of an EU Member State‟s 
court invalidating the arbitration agreement for reasons not admitted in the NYC be 
automatically recognised in other Member States this could lead to a breach of Art. II NCY.
303
 
The same applies for the annulling of arbitral awards and Art. VII NYC. 
 
With the suggested amendment arbitration related proceedings are generally still kept outside 
the Brussels I Regulation. Nevertheless, the problem of abusive litigation tactics and parallel 




The Proposal impressively demonstrates that the problem of parallel proceedings and the 
demarcation problems regarding arbitration-related court proceedings can be solved by 
keeping the arbitration exclusion in general and making amendments only to a very limited 
extent. The convincing advantage of this solution is that it can clearly be controlled where the 
regulation should apply and where not.
304
 The unpredictable consequences of a complete 
deletion can be avoided in this way. In opposite to the Green Paper, the Proposal took the 





With the recital (11) it clarifies the general exclusion of arbitration. However, in order to 
avoid last doubts caused by the case law in that field it is suggested to add that the regulation 
does not apply to „the form, existence, validity or effects of arbitration agreements‟ 
‘regardless whether raised as a main object or incidental question’. Recital (20) emphasises 
the aim of improving the effectiveness of arbitration agreements and avoiding parallel 
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proceedings. The determination of the seat of arbitration takes the will of the parties and the 
idea of arbitration successfully into account and renounces wisely a default rule. Art. 29 (4) 
succeed to address the problem of parallel proceedings and abusive litigation tactics at a very 
early stage. Therewith it makes an extra ground for refusing judgments in breach of an 
arbitration agreement obsolete which would ran counter the aim to abolish exequatur. 
Moreover, the suggestion carefully takes the different national laws into account and avoids 




















Even though cases where the problems that derive from the exclusion of arbitration are in 
practice limited in number, it is important to change the current situation in the EU. 
Arbitration, and on this point everyone is in agreement, becomes increasingly important in 
international commerce and it is therefore advisable to give arbitration agreements and awards 
the fullest possible effect. The ECJ‟s case law has shown that the generally well-functioning 
Brussels I Regulation leads to problems when it comes to the interface with arbitration 
proceedings. These problems occur in the form of parallel arbitration and litigation 
proceedings as well as in the indistinct demarcation whether or not arbitration related court 
proceedings fall under the arbitration exclusion.
306
 The recent West Tanker case emphasised 
the problem of abusive litigation tactics and parallel litigation once more.
307
 With the 
prohibition of anti-suit injunctions within the application area of the Brussels I Regulation the 
ECJ diminished the attractiveness of London as an important European place of arbitration. 
This also applies to France whose doctrine of negative competence-competence is invalidated 




The three official documents, namely the Heidelberg Report, the Green Paper and the latest 
Proposal of the European Commission have shown how different the methods of resolution 
for the existing problems can be.
309
 The reactions of academia and practitioners who are 
constantly confronted and hence very familiar with the topic, illustrated abundantly that the 
suspicion of unforeseeable consequences actually outweighs the ambition of improving the 
present situation. This fear is understandable. Many proposals which sound convincing at first 
sight turn out to have drastic and negative side effects as the critical evaluation illustrated.
310
 
This applies particularly to the far-reaching suggestion of a complete deletion of the 
arbitration exclusion whose effects are not predictable in each and every respect. However, 
unpredictability in this matter would automatically lead to a restraint or even a complete 
refusal to choose EU countries as a place of international arbitration which in turn results in 
commercial damage for the underlying business.  
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The paper has shown that both radicals do not contribute to the popularity of international 
arbitration in Europe: leaving the situation as it is at the moment as well as fundamental 
reforms that try to include arbitration as a whole into the system of the Brussels I Regulation 
which is intended to serve the purpose of litigation rather than arbitration. It is therefore wise 
to amend the regulation only to a minimum extent in order to react targeted to the present 
problems regarding the interface of the Brussels I Regulation with arbitration proceedings. 
 
With the Proposal the European Commission presented a very convincing solution. Contrary 
to the Heidelberg Report and the Green Paper it confines the changes to a minimum. In order 
to pick up on the often used adage in this context „If it ain´t broke, don´t fix it!‟
311
 the 
Proposal suggests to fix it only to the extent it is broken. It keeps arbitration generally outside 
the scope of the Brussels I Regulation but solves the problems of abusive litigation tactics and 
parallel proceedings with introducing basically just one new article. In doing so it succeeds 
moreover to take the single national arbitration laws and the NYC into account and not to 
contravene them, thus respecting both the autonomy of the member states and their 
international obligations. 
 
It would be desirable that the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers adopt the 
Proposal, maybe with the slight changes suggested in this paper. This would give the EU 
countries a solid and arbitration friendly framework and the fundamental requirements in 
order to prevail as a popular centre of arbitration. 
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